THE ORIGIN OF 
THE WAR 

Facts and Documents 

BY 

KARL FEDERN 

AUTHOR OF 

"DANTE AND HIS TIME," "HISTORY OF CARDINAL MAZARIN," 

"essays on AMERICAN LITERATURE," 

ETC. 




G. W. DILLINGHAM COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS NEW YORK 



^f'l 



,^^ 



6 



Copyright, iqis; by 
KARL FEDERN 

Copyright, 191S, by 
G. W. DILLINGHAM COMPANY 



TBe Orkitt of the War 



©CI.A416661 

DEC -I 1915 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I. Introductory Words 5 

II. War Preparations 8 

III. The Crisis. Russia and the Austro-Serv- 

ian Question 42 

IV. A Digression on the British Blue Book 105 

V. The Crisis. England and the Belgian 

Question 124 

App. I. The German Ultimatum 170 

" 11. The French Yellow Book ..... 173 



I. INTRODUCTORY WORDS 

These pages have not been written to gratify 
the passions of nationalism of any kind or to 
indulge in hatred of hostile countries and na- 
tions. I believe that if the peoples of civilized 
countries had correct notions of each other's real 
disposition and were not misled by interested 
persons, this fearful war might never have been 
precipitated. And I fear that an increase of 
hatred between the civilized nations of the eartK 
will be its most deplorable result. 

I have lived in England and France, and have 
in both these countries very real sympathies. 
French history and French literature have been 
the chief subject of my studies and publications 
for many years, as my readers know: I cannot 
but love the country and the nation whose spirit 
has attracted me so far as to make me give my 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 



chief attention to its development. And I am 
deeply indebted to French scholars for the kind 
assistance given by them to my work. I have 
been a member of the Comite for the Rapproche- 
ment Intellectuel Franco- Allemand ; and as for 
England, I wrote articles during the Boer war 
to defend the British point of view, when I was 
almost alone in my nation to do so. I have for 
a long time considered English civilization as 
foremost and the English constitution as a model. 
I have constantly been pleading for an under- 
standing between Germany and France and Eng- 
land as the most advanced nations of Europe. I 
do not believe in Lord Palmerston's maxim, 
''Right or wrong, my country" ; on the contrary, 
I do believe it to be a most pernicious principle. 
I trust I may be able to discuss the present situa- 
tion with calmness and impartiality. 

From an international viewpoint I have at- 
tempted to scrutinize as briefly as possible the 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 



facts which led to the war. These facts cover 
a much larger field than those contained in the 
multicolored books, particularly the German 
White Book and the British White Papers, the 
documents most generally known. 



IL WAR-PREPARATIONS 

On the very last day on which postal inter- 
course between France and Germany seemed pos- 
sible, I wrote to a dear friend in Paris who is 
now doing his duty as an officer in the French 
army, the following words: 

''These are days of horrible suspense. The 
iattitude of the Government as well as that of 
the public here in Berlin is admirable, very quiet 
and very resolute; if it is to be war, they will 
fight with a fury which will be the more terrible, 
'for the very reason that they do not desire to 
fight ! Do not believe what your papers tell you ; 
I live here and I see: Neither the emperor, nor 
the Government, nor the people want war; it is 
Russia who forces them by threatening Austria, 
their ally. And if the war is to be, Germany 
will win, do not doubt that; but my heart is op- 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 



pressed by the thought of what a new defeat will 
mean for France. France will pay for the crime 
of her statesmen who have made the shameful al- 
liance with Russia, an alliance contradictory to 
all that is really great and glorious in French 
history." 

I am still convinced that in writing these words 
I have chanced upon the wound of which Europe 
is now bleeding. 

The league of England and France with Rus- 
sia, the league of the two most advanced, the 
two most western states of Europe, with the 
oriental empire whose spirit is directly opposed 
to theirs, is the most astonishing political fac- 
tor in this war. Surely, powerful political rea- 
sons must have induced Western statesmen to 
forget such an antagonism; considerations of 
great weight must have covered the abyss which 
separated the lands of freedom and democracy 
from the despotic state where hanging, torturing, 



lo ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

and political exile are the means of government. 
Was it a moral or let us rather say a com- 
pelling political reason, the true interest of their 
country, which moved French statesmen to con- 
clude that famous alliance so often deplored by 
Frenchmen of mark? Or was it the old desire 
for ''Revanche" for Sedan that made the Re- 
publican Government give Russian despotism 
some twenty billions to continue its rule of op- 
pression over the Poles, Finlanders, Jews, Ru- 
thenians, and the other subjugated races ? With- 
out such assistance the political freedom of the 
Russian people themselves would have made 
rapid strides/ Was it all in the interest of as- 
suring the peace of Europe — for this was the 
official formula of the alliance — that in these 
last years loans were furnished for the special 

*See Prince Kropotkin's pamphlet, "The White Terror," and 
the speech on "The Horrors of Russian Prisons," made by the 
late Frangois de Pressense, on February 13, 1913, in the "Hotel 
des Societes Savantes" in Paris. 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR ii 

purpose of building strategic railways on the 
Austrian border? Was it all disinterested pa- 
triotism, when the French Boulevard Press wrote 
on behalf of Russia and inflamed the French 
mind against Germany, systematically reviving 
that thirst for revenge which was beginning to 
fade in the new generation? It is an open se- 
cret that this campaign was headed with par- 
ticular vigour by the "Matin" after its direc- 
tor's journey to Russia about two years ago, and 
that the "Temps,'' seeing the growing influence 
of the "Matin," attempted to vie with its rival. 

England, on the other hand, was actuated by 
the desire to secure the so-called balance of power 
in Europe, and seeing Germany's rapid growth, 
tried and succeeded in reconciling France after 
the "affront" of Fashoda and in making the 
"Entente Cordiale" with that Power. 

France and England, however, had been 
friends and allies before. It was a much bigger 



12 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

change in England's foreign politics when it be- 
came the friend of its old formidable opponent 
in Europe and Asia. How often has war seemed 
imminent between Russia and England since the 
English fleet appeared in the ^Egean in 1878, 
down to 1904, when England's Japanese ally de- 
feated the Russians in Manchuria, and Russian 
warships shot at British boats in the North Sea ! 

The clever monarch, the shrewd politician who 
caused English politics to veer around to such 
an extent was King Edward VII. After the 
period of England's "splendid isolation" he origi- 
nated a policy if not exactly of alliances yet one 
of "ententes" and succeeded in forming what 
Sir Edward Grey chose to call "not an alliance 
but a diplomatic group"; though the "Entente"- 
of this "diplomatic group," as everybody is now 
able to ascertain, has proved more binding and 
effective than other alliances. 

Was it Germany who threatened the world's 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 13 

peace and made this powerful league necessary 
in order to preserve it? It is true that since her 
wonderful resurrection from division and decay 
: — an incredible and incomparable resurrection 
after the country's having been divided in itself 
and powerless for ages, the toy of foreign in- 
fluences, the battle-field of foreign ambitions, — 
it is true, I say, that since the reconstruction 
of the Empire in 1871, Germany has constantly 
risen in power, commerce, industry, — it is true 
that she has built a great fleet and has gone on 
organizing a great army. Yet with all her 
power, with an army which though far from 
being the biggest, may perhaps be considered the 
best of the world, with an ever-growing fleet, 
she has preserved peace for full forty-three years, 
though occasions for making war on one of her 
neighbours were not wanting. 

I ask any man who knows history : Is there in 
'the history of Europe the case of a nation which, 



14 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

after three victorious wars, with an ever-grow- 
ing population and an ever better organized mili- 
tary force, did nevertheless keep peace for full 
forty-three years? When did France remain 
peaceful under such conditions? She waged war 
after war whenever she had the power to do so. 
And Russia ? And England ? How many wars, 
conquests, expeditions in all parts of the world 
in the same period! 

The German colonies were all gained by ami- 
cable arrangement, as far as civilized nations are 
concerned, while those of other countries have 
been almost all conquered by the sword. Even 
America has obtained possession of the Philip- 
pines by conquest. 

Occasions, as I said, were not wanting. If Ger- 
many considered Russia's power dangerous, what 
an opportunity for crushing it in 1904, during 
the Japanese war, when England was bound to 
assist Japan! If she thought England her rival, 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 15 

what an occasion during the Boer War, when 
England was hated all around and by no nation 
more fiercely than by the French! 

And yet there are men who dare say that Ger- 
many, who gave such an example of peace ful- 
ness, an example unparalleled in history, threat- 
ened the other nations. 

But, they say, Germany was a threat by her 
very existence! And there is a hidden truth 
in their saying so; though this truth is quite the 
contrary of that which they intend to convey. 
The truth is, they chose to consider Germany's 
existence a threat because they disliked her grow- 
ing power, her commerce, her riches, her influ- 
ence, the successful competition of her manufac- 
tures, her merchants, her ships throughout the 
world. They saw indeed a threat in all this. 
But what else does such a feeling imply, what 
else the numerous expressions of dislike and fear, 
but that they would have liked to threaten Ger- 



i6 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

many and, waiting for the favorable moment, 
continued to prepare the world for their plans by 
crying out: "See how Germany threatens us!'* 

But Germany constantly increased her army 
and her fleet! you may say. Has not Russia al- 
ways had an army greater than the German 
forces? Has not France devised an immense 
army of white, black and brown men, and not 
civilized blacks and browns, as known in the 
States, but from aboriginal savages? Has not 
England constantly increased her own fleet? and 
the other states as well?^ 

You may perhaps answer : It is true, but they 
were forced to do so because of Germany's con- 



* That the German fleet whose constant increase was a special 
reproach made to Germany by English writers, was too small, 
has been proved in the present war by its being unable to protect 
Germany's commerce and her colonies. And surely it will be 
conceded as a just demand that a nation whose commercial fleet 
is the second in the world, has the right, as well as the duty, to 
build a fleet sufficient to protect it. Germany never raised the 
exorbitant claim that her navy — or for that, neither her army — 
had to be the biggest in the world as England did. 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 17 

slant and powerful preparations and her alli- 
ances. But, Germany and Austria and Italy to- 
gether — had from the very beginning fewer men, 
a smaller army, and a much smaller fleet than the 
Triple Entente, — Besides, the two Empires could 
count upon Italy only in some very particular 
cases; and English statesmen knew this very 
well} 

The forces of the European armies in March, 
19 14, were (according to Capt Rottmann) : 

Number Army plus number 

of men on of men in trained 

peace footing reserve 

German Army 781,000 4,000,000 

Austro-Hungarian 4i4,QQO ^ 3,720,000 

Armies of Germany and Aus- 
tria-Hungary 1,195,000 7,720,000 

French Army 900,000 4,600,000 

English Army 258,000 730,ooo 

Russian Army , 1,850,000 7,400,000 

Armies of the Triple- War- 
Entente 3,008,000 force 12,730,000 

* Including "Landsturm." 

*In the "Nineteenth Century and After" of July, 1911, Sir 
William H. White, late Director of Naval Construction, in an 
article entitled "The Naval Outlook," stated his "belief that the 



i8 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

This shows clearly that, in March, 19 14, the 
armies of the Triple-Entente on peace-footing 
outnumbered those of Germany and Austria- 
Hungary by nearly 2,000,000; while the war- 
force of the Triple-Entente outnumbered that of 
Germany and Austria-Hungary by no less than 
I 5,000,000!! 

The most striking fact to be deduced from 
these figures is that the peace- force of the Triple- 
Entente, the peace- force which forms the nucleus 
of every standing army and which forms the 
regular and most expensive part of war-prep- 
arations, was nearly three times as big as that 
of the two central Powers, Germany and Aus- 
tria-Hungary — a fact which seems almost suffi- 
cient to prove which side was preparing war 
against the other ! 

Italian Navy will never be found arrayed against the British 
Navy," and he begs it "to be understood that although Italy 
has been included by him in some hypothetical anti-British com- 
binations, the assumption is adopted solely for statistical pur- 
poses." 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 19 

It is therefore erroneous to believe that these 
powerful preparations which weighed on Europe, 
and their constant increase, were due to German 
politics. Still more erroneous is the notion, wide- 
spread though it be, that the system of armed 
peace, that ^'Modern Militarism,'' so to speak, is 
a German invention. On the contrary, it is a 
purely French invention. Public opinion is 
quickly made to forget the origin of an insti- 
tution, but History does not lose sight of great 
events. It was Lazare Carnot, member of the 
'"Comite de Salut Public," who invented the 
'"levees en masses," the transforming of the 
whole nation into an immense army. It was Na- 
poleon who used for his conquests the instrument 
that the republic had prepared for him and who 
threatened the whole world by militarising the 
French nation to the youngest boy who was able 
to carry arms. Remembering past danger, and 
desirous of preventing its return, Prussia — and 



20 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

after the foundation of the Empire, Germany — 
adopted and perfected the French system. 

Germany had every reason to adopt this sys- 
tem. The reader is requested to give one short 
look at the map. He will see Germany in her 
central situation, with an open border on every 
side, without any natural defences, any natural 
[frontier — with the sole exception of the Austrian 
border, — ^with a widely stretched coast open fo 
any aggression, particularly if England were to 
be among her enemies. The German borderline 
is long, flat, absolutely open towards Russia. 
The Vosges mountains which form the French 
border, are of easy access from the French side. 
Steep and ragged towards Germany, they form 
a kind of bulwark only for France. They are, 
as they have proved in the present war, a con- 
venient door for inroads into Germany. 

A single look at the map is sufficient to show 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 21 

that Germany, unless surrounded by friends and 
allies, had to maintain an efficient army, if she 
intended to continue her existence unimpaired. 
She had a friend, an ally in the south only. In 
the east, along an unprotected borderline of about 
a thousand miles in length, her neighbour was 
immense Russia, with almost double the number 
of inhabitants, with an army of many millions of 
men. Nicolas I — the great-grandfather of the 
present Czar — said as early as 1849 ^^ ^^ French 
General Lamoriciere: ''If, against my wish and 
yours, Germany should succeed in becoming a 
unified state, she will, in order to enjoy her re- 
gained union, need a man able to do what Na- 
poleon himself could not accomplish. And if 
such a man should be born, if the armed mass 
should become dangerous, it will be incumbent on 
us, on France and Russia, to subdue her V ^ That 



^ Letter of General Lamoriciere to Alexis de Tocqueville, pub- 
lished in Tocqueville's "Souvenirs," Paris, 1893, p. 383. 



22 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

was the feeling and the program in Russia in 
1849. Nicolas II, the present Czar, concluded 
the Treaty of Alliance with France which was 
to realize this program. In addition, Russia was 
the rival and irreconcilable enemy of Austria, 
Germany's only reliable friend, — but more of this 
later. 

That France was Germany's enemy, that she 
would have gladly profited by any occasion to 
humiliate her may be called a truism. I do not 
believe there is a Frenchman who will deny that 
France's alliance with Russia was prompted by 
a desire to regain her two much loved provinces. 
Whether or not this desire was justifiable from 
the French standpoint, it was certainly a seri- 
ous menace to the peace of the German people. 

And if in English politics such a change took 
place as to make friends not only with France 
after having stood at the brink of war with her, 
but even with Russia, her arch enemy of old, — 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 23 

there is but one Power against which her policy 
could be directed. There never existed any doubt 
about this in the world 

During all this time the German Empire had 
not changed its political attitude toward one of 
the three Powers. As to Russia, an old friend- 
ship united the two dynasties. Germany gave a 
signal proof of it in 1904. There was even too 
much of friendship for Russia, many people felt. 

Germany never had had a quarrel with Eng- 
land, never even the thought of a quarrel with 
her. The Imperial Government remained firm 
even during the Boer War, when popular feel- 
ing in Germany — as indeed all over Europe — 
seemed to demand an intervention, less out of 
animosity toward England than out of sympathy 
for the two Dutch republics. As late as August 
6, 1914, Mr. Asquith stated in his speech in Par- 
liament that ''for many years and indeed genera- 
tions past Germany had been a friendly Power." 



24 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

The danger that Germany might ever make an 
aggressive war on England was altogether chi- 
merical. The fact that Germany accepted the 
British proposal of keeping the respective num- 
bers of battleships at the ratio of i6: lO is proof 
of Germany's attitude. 

There had been times of tension between Ger- 
many and France, particularly concerning Mo- 
rocco, where both Powers had great commercial 
interests. But the difficulties had been adjusted, 
certainly not to the disadvantage of France. 
Moreover, it is a known fact that Germany — 
foreseeing great danger from other parts — ar- 
dently wished to reconcile France. There is a 
most interesting letter from Sir E. Goschen, Brit- 
ish Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey, 
— published in the English Blue Book (on page 
78, No. 159). While relating his last decisive 
interview with the German Foreign Secretary on 
August 4, in which he stated for the second time 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 25 

that "unless Germany could give the assurance 
that they would stop their advance in Belgium 
he should have to demand his passports," the 
Ambassador states: 'In a short conversation 
v^hich ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his 
poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire 
policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been 
to make friends with Great Britain, and then, 
through Great Britain to get closer to France," 
After this Sir E. Goschen went to see the Chan- 
cellor, whom he found "very agitated" ; and who 
said: "that Great Britain was going to make war 
on a kindred nation who desired nothing better 
than to be friends with her. All his efforts in 
that direction had been rendered useless by this 
last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I 
knew, he had devoted himself since his acces- 
sion to office, had tumbled down like a house of 
cards." Now these are statements, which states- 
men in office would not make, unless 'Very agi- 



26 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

tated.'' But the change in British politics from 
diplomatic into warlike moves was overwhelming. 
Germany had never taken one aggressive step 
against England, had in fact since the time of 
the Berlin Congress taken many in her favor. 
She was satisfied to "have her place in the sun," 
satisfied to see her own growing industry and 
commerce, to develop her social legislation, to 
develop the tendencies of art, music, science, and 
invention, inborn in the nation. 

In this development England scented danget 
to her own prosperity, but instead of rejuve-' 
nating the inner structure of her Empire on the 
basis of good old English ideals, she chose the 
easier way of forming diplomatic alliances with 
Russia, France, Japan, and Portugal. The result 
of this war and the development of the next 
generation will show whether a strengthening of 
England by these auxiliaries which lay outside 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 27 



of the Kingdom, was as sound as the consolida- 
tion of the inner forces of its rival. 

Germany, ever rising during peace, had no rea- 
son to risk, by a dangerous v^ar, the great re- 
sults she had attained. 

According to this view, they arranged the bias 
of their politics and made their preparations. Of 
the nations that encircled Germany by the most 
powerful league the world has ever seen, it was 
England's task to increase the sphere of diplo- 
matic influence, which she succeeded in doing by 
attaching Japan and Portugal. 

France organized her 'Jorce noire" ^ Russia in 
1912 created the "Balkan-League.'' This league 
would have added another million of warriors 
to the army which the powers of the Triple- 
Entente could have opposed to Germany and 

^ A book was published in France in 1908 by an officer, Lt.-Col 
Mangin, in which the author divulges that, by realizing her 
plans, France would soon be able to hurl 100,000 Arabs and 
40,000 black men into the first battle which would take place at 



28 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

Austria, had things but gone as was hoped for. 
One could scarcely attribute it to an excess of 
caution when, seeing this tremendous array and 
increase of forces around her, the German Gov- 
ernment demanded sums for the necessary in- 
crease of her own defence in the form of the 
"Wehrheitrag" and at the same time induced 
Austria to hasten the completion of her much 
neglected preparations. Yet such was the ef- 
fect of a clever agitation and of long repeated 
assertions that all Europe was made to see in 
this a confirmation of Germany's threatening 
attitude toward her neighbours, and even clever 
men credited the legend that France was forced 
to introduce the very unpopular law of the Three 
Years' Service as a measure against the results 

the end of the third week after the declaration of war. The 
author is fully confident — as early as in 1908 — that the "Allies" 
of France would hold the Atlantic open for the transportation 
of that force. The reader may judge how carefully the Anglo- 
French plans have been prepared, how exactly they have been 
carried out! 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 29 

of the German Wehrheitrag} I confess that I 
would have beheved it myself had I not happened 
to be in France at the time, where a well-known 
politician told me that the French bill had been 
prepared by the war-office two months before any- 
body had had the least notice of the German plan. 
It is only to avoid giving annoyance that I am 
silent about his name. 

Finally, in the year 191 3, the French Ambas- 
sador in Petersburg, M. Delcasse, arranged with 
the Russian Government for a further loan of 
2j^ milliards of francs, which sum France was 
to furnish to Russia in five annual rates for the 
chief purpose of the construction of strategic 
railways on the German and Austrian borders. 
The purpose was openly avowed; the proposed 
lines were mentioned with every necessary de- 

* Compare the passage concerning that law in the Note of 
M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, of March 17, 
1913 (French Yellow Book No. i). 



30 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

tail in the treaty presented to the French Cham- 
ber, as well as in the bill which was brought 
before the Duma; the whole matter was dis- 
cussed for weeks in French papers and reviews 
of all kinds, but being adopted by Russia and 
France against Germany, it does not seem to 
have been considered a threatening step. Quite 
to the contrary, it was all done in the interest of 
peace. 

These were public transactions; others whicH 
might seem almost still more important were 
secret, though they did not remain so to the Ger- 
man Government. In November, 191 2, the Brit- 
ish Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward 
Grey, and the French Ambassador in London, 
M. Paul Cambon, exchanged letters of almost 
literally the same tenor, which ran thus : 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 31 

Foreign Office, Nov. 22, 19 12. 
My dear Ambassador, 

From time to time in recent years the French 
and British naval and miHtary experts have con- 
suhed together. It has always been understood 
that such consultation does not restrict the free- 
dom of either Government to decide at any fu- 
ture time whether or not to assist the other by 
armed force. We have agreed that consulta- 
tion between experts is not, and ought not to be 
regarded as, an engagement that commits either 
Government to action in a contingency that has 
not arisen and may never arise. The disposi- 
tion, for instance, of the French and British 
fleets respectively at the present moment is not 
based upon an engagement to co-operate in war. 

You have, however, pointed out that, if either 
Government had grave reason to expect an un- 
provoked attack by a third power, it might be- 
come essential to know whether it could in that 
event depend upon the armed assistance of the 
other. 

I agree that, if either Government had grave 
reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third 
power, or something that threatened the general 



32 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

peace, it should immediately discuss with the 
other whether both Governments should act to- 
gether to prevent aggression and to preserve 
peace, and, if so, what measures they would be 
prepared to take in common. If these measures 
involved action, the plans of the General Staffs 
would at once be taken into consideration, and 
the Government would then decide what effect 
should be given to them. 

Yours, 

E. Gre:y. 

These important documents were not published 
until September, 1914, but they had come to the 
knowledge of the German Government as early 
as in March, 191 3. Formally they were not to 
"restrict the freedom of either Government to 
decide at any future time whether or not to assist 
the other by armed force.'' In the English letter 
it is even carefully stated that the "contingency 
has not arisen and may never arise"; the omis- 
sion of the same words in the French Ambas- 
sador's letter is rather remarkable. But to be- 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 33 



lieve that, because of these restrictions, the 
exchange of the two letters was a mere act of 
international courtesy would be a glaring ab- 
surdity. Ministers of Great Powers do not write 
such letters or arrange consultations of military 
and naval experts without most seriously con- 
sidering and desiring a future co-operation in 
war. They could not express their common re- 
solve in a more binding form without disclosing 
their plans to the eyes of all the world. A formal 
treaty would have required the sanction of the 
English Parliament; the debate would have 
proven to all the world who was really prepar- 
ing for war and endangering the peace of Eu- 
rope. Moreover, it was to be feared that the 
majority of the English Parliament would refuse 
to sanction the proceeding of the Government 
It was Sir Edward Grey's business to prepare 
English public opinion for the ''contingency that 
might never arise," and still more to convince 



34 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

the Parliament of the necessity of co-operation 
with France when the contingency had come. 
He could therefore not go further than he did. 
He remained cautious to the last. He wrote to 
the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir F. Bertie, 
on July 31, 1914, when the danger of a general 
conflagration was imminent: ''I have told the 
French Ambassador that we should not be jus- 
tified in giving a definite pledge to intervene in 
a war at the present moment but that we will 
certainly consider the situation again directly 
there is a new development/' (Brit. Blue Book 
No. 116; French Yellow Book No. no.) An 
English statesman is a very responsible person, 
the Commons and Public Opinion are his mas- 
ters, and he has to manage them carefully in 
order to make them do his will. The "new de- 
velopment" could not fail to arrive. 

Such was the condition of affairs as far as 
England and France were concerned. Negotia- 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 35 

tions for bringing about a similar agreement for 
future military, and more particularly naval, co- 
operation between England and Russia, began in 
the spring of 19 14, at the occasion of King 
George's visit to Paris. It seems that the idea 
was M. Iswolskij's. It was warmly recommended 
by Sir Edward Grey in the English Cabinet. On 
May 26, a conference, presided over by the chief 
of the Russian Navy Staff, took place in St. Pe- 
tersburg. This conference came to the conclu- 
sion that a naval agreement was highly desir- 
able and that an understanding should be ef- 
fected between the two navies concerning sig- 
nals, ciphers, and wireless telegraphy; that both 
staffs should communicate on all questions of 
interest, and that strategic co-operation in the 
case of war should be prepared. Operations of 
the Russian fleet in the Bosporus, in the Darda- 
nelles, and in the Mediterranean should be dis- 
cussed. But the most interesting part of the 



36 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

plan outlined is the following: England should 
force as many German ships as possible to re- 
main in the North-Sea, and to facilitate a Rus- 
sian invasion of the German coast, the English 
Government should send as many transport-ships 
as possible to Russian ports before the begin- 
ning of maritime operations, that is to say in 
time of peace. 

If Sir Edward Grey's policy was not hostile 
to Germany and a menace to the peace of Eu- 
rope, what policy may be called hostile and a 
menace to peace? And if this was not prepar- 
ing war against Germany, what is preparing war 
against a country ? 

It is an extraordinary institution which per- 
mits a statesman to conclude most important 
and even fatal "agreements'' with foreign Powers 
and yet enables him to say in Parliament again 
and again and even as late as on the third of 
August, 1914: "1 have assured the House that 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 37 

if any crisis such as this arose the House of Com- 
mons should be free to decide what the British 
attitude should be; that there was no secret en- 
gagement which the Government could spring 
upon the House and tell the House that, because 
they had entered into that engagement, there was 
an obligation of honour upon the country!" 

No, indeed, it was not a question of honour, 
it was all a matter of sagacious management! 

It was this mode of procedure which caused 
Mr. Ramsay Macdonald to write in the "Labour 
Leader": "During the last eight years Sir Ed- 
ward Grey has been a menace to the peace of 
Europe and his policy disastrous to England!" 
while a liberal member of the British Parliament, 
Mr. Ponsonby, wrote in the ^'Nation" that "he 
could find Sir Edward Grey's agreements neither 
right nor reasonable." 

Sir Edward Grey as a constitutional minister 
had to employ great diplomacy in his choice of 



38 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

words. Mr. Sazonof as a Russian minister had 
an easier task. When asked by a German states- 
man about the naval agreement — for this time 
every stage of the negotiations had immediately 
come to the knowledge of the German Govern- 
ment, and thanks to French indiscretion even the 
press had got hints of it — when thus questioned, 
Mr. Sazonof bluntly answered that "such an 
agreement only existed in the moon and in the 
imagination of the 'Berliner TageUattf '' 

Contrast with these utterances the well-remem- 
bered speech made by the German Emperor in 
the London Guildhall; and later in Bremen on 
March 22, 1905 : ''History has taught me never 
to aspire to the hollow ideal of a Universal Mon- 
archy. I have sworn to myself that this thought 
shall never enter my soul. What has become of 
all the large empires which were extended over 
a great part of the world? Alexander the Great, 
Napoleon, all the great warriors weltered in 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 39 

blood and at their death left conquered nations 
which arose at the first occasion. And the Em- 
pires soon crumbled to pieces. The world-wide 
Empire of which I dream will come into existence 
when the new German Empire will be recognized 
as a quiet, honest, and peaceful neighbour, when 
it will enjoy the fullest confidence from every 
side; and if History should ever record a Ger- 
man Universal Monarchy, a world-wide rule 
of the Hohenzollern, such rule and such Mon- 
archy shall not be founded on conquests won by 
the sword but on the mutual confidence of na- 
tions striving for the same ends. To express it 
in the words of the great poet I wish it to be 
''Limited in its boundaries, boundless inwardly !" 
That the monarch, who has now been so un- 
justly abused by a hostile press, was sincere, 
that he really gave expression to his inmost 
thought, is proven by the fact that he has kept 
his word and stuck to his resolution for full 



40 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

twenty-six years, in spite of various occasions 
which might have well drawn him into war. In 
doing so he has only acted in accordance with 
the spirit of the nation. Everybody who knows 
the German nation knows how essentially peace- 
ful it is by nature. Perhaps, for the very rea- 
son that it is so slow to be stirred, it is so terrible 
in war, when once aroused. If any one thing 
above all others has obtained for the Emperor 
the love of his subjects, the esteem and well- 
meaning even of radicals and socialists, it is the 
fact that he has kept peace for so long a period. 
Compared with such fundamentals, the war cries 
of the jingoes, or clever and enthusiastic books 
on war, written by generals out of service, prove 
nothing. In the Parliament there was absolutely 
no war-party at all, and in the Nation the party 
that advocated war was small to insignificance. 
It is curious to observe the contrast between 
William II and Napoleon III, who when he be- 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 41 



came Emperor of France in 1852 pronoimced the 
famous words: ''U Empire c'est la paixT and 
who, only two years later, undertook the Crimean 
War (1854), made war on Austria in 1859, un- 
dertook the expedition to Mexico in 1862, the 
Italian expedition in 1867, and the war against 
Germany in 1870— all of this in the short eigh- 
teen years of his reign. 



III. THE CRISIS 

RUSSIA AND THE AUSTRO-SERVIAN 
QUESTION 

When the diplomatic group which formed the 
Triple-Entente prepared for the war, they pre- 
pared for a war on their own terms, that is to 
say, when the Russian fleet would be recon- 
structed, the Russian railway completed, the 
French army perfected and increased by the 
Three Years' Service, the unity among the Bal- 
kan Slavs restored, and Turkey — which might 
be expected to side with Germany — reduced to 
utter prostration and helplessness. 

But suddenly the Servian question projected 
itself as an appalling crisis. 

It is impossible, nor would it be of importance 
to speak here at any length of the constant 

troubles in the Balkans which so often have kept 

42 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 43 

Europe in tension and in fear of imminent war. 
Of the four Christian nations which Hve in the 
Peninsula the Servians and the Roumanians are 
Austria's neighbours. But the relations between 
Austria and Servia are much older and have al- 
ways been incomparably more intimate than those 
between Austria and Roumania. The border- 
line between Austria and the two Servian coun- 
tries, Servia and Montenegro, is more than four 
hundred miles in length. In the Middle Ages 
the Servians had repeatedly been rescued from 
the Turks by Hungarian armies. When they 
were finally subjugated, in the fifteenth century, 
a great part of them fled to Hungary and settled 
there for good, in the two provinces called Bacska 
and Banat. In later times those who had passed 
under the Mussulman yoke were again freed by 
the Austrians under Prince Eugene. In the eigh- 
teenth century Servia had long been an Aus- 
trian province. And when reconquered by the 



44 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

Turks, the Servians repeatedly rose up and 
wanted to return to Austrian rule, although the 
Imperial Government was, in those times, 
scarcely less despotic. The same desire was ex- 
pressed by them more than once during the nine- 
teenth century. It was not until then that the 
rival influence of Russia began to make itself 
felt. Since that time the Servians were assisted 
now by the one and now by the other power and 
finally the inhabitants of the present kingdom 
recovered their full independence, in 1878, by 
fighting successfully against the Turks after the 
latter had been defeated by the Russians and the 
Roumanians at Plevna. The control of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina was allotted to Austria-Hun- 
gary in the same year at the Berlin Congress, 
remaining nominally under Turkish suzerainty 
from which it had in reality been freed. 

In the new kingdom of Servia Austrian influ- 
ence was soon again predominant and remained 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 45 

so for many years. When in 1885 the Bulgarians 
defeated the Servian army at Slivnitza, Austria 
saved Servia by the threat of an armed inter- 
vention in her behalf. There v^as, however, a 
Russophile as well as an Austrophile party in 
Servia. 

Russian agents, certainly not for love of their 
"Servian brethren" but rather from political op- 
position to Austria — incited the Nationalist 
party in Servia to strive toward uniting under 
the same rule the whole territory inhabited by 
their race. For, only about 3,000,000 Serbo- 
Croatians, as the race is called, live in the King- 
dom of Servia, while no less than 5,000,000 live 
in Austria, Hungary, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
That the Servians of Servia should wish to re- 
conquer this whole big territory and in this way 
become the most powerful state in the Peninsula 
may perhaps be considered quite natural. But 
certainly it is quite as natural and even much 



46 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

more natural that Austria should regard such 
aspiration with disquietude and should refuse 
to part with five millions of her people, most of 
whom have lived under her rule for centuries 
and only a very small number of whom after 
much secret agitation and more or less secret 
bribery, would willingly go from her and be in- 
corporated in the kingdom of "Greater Servia." 
There is another point of view from which the 
question is to be regarded and which is never 
kept in mind by foreign writers — the matter of 
religion, so much more powerful in those parts 
than race or nationality can ever become. The 
3,000,000 Servians of Servia are almost all Or- 
thodox^; while of the 3,500,000 Servians who 
live in Austria and Hungary 2j^ millions are Ro- 
man Catholics (it is they who call themselves 
Croatians) and of the 1,500,000 Servians in Bos- 

*That is to say, members of the Greek Church. They are 
3,000,000 or more since the aggrandizement of tlie Kingdom in 
1912. 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 47 

nia and Herzegovina almost two-thirds are 
either Catholic or Mahometan. Now both Ma- 
hometans and Catholics look on the Orthodox 
Servians with abhorrence. They would as soon 
think of going to perdition as of becoming the 
countrymen of the ''Servians" ; they have proven 
their feelings by their fury in the present war. 
The Catholic Servians, the Croatians, have al- 
ways been the staunchest adherents and most 
faithful subjects of the Austrian Dynasty. The 
oldest Infantry Regiment in the Austrian Army, 
the 53d Warasdin Regiment, is a Croatian regi- 
ment, and none has fought so brilliantly in Servia 
in the present war as this particular regiment. 
Administration is certainly much better in the 
Austrian parts than in the Kingdom. Commerce, 
agriculture, industry are flourishing in quite an- 
other way in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
than in Servia; justice, public security and of- 



48 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

ficial integrity are to be found there in a degree 
unknown in Servia, 

Let us compare the results attained in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina which have now been under 
Austro-Hungarian control for 36 years with the 
corresponding achievements in the Kingdom, the 
foundation of which coincides with that of the 
provinces. We shall find that under an able gov- 
ernment the progress of Bosnia has been such as 
could never have been attained in the Kingdom. 
Though the birth rate has increased in about an 
equal degree, the increase of Commerce — import 
and export together, — in Bosnia was, in spite of 
the smaller population, from 8 milHons of crowns 
in 1879 to 226 millions in 1906 and 2"]^ milHons 
in 1910; in Servia from 80 millions in 1879 to 
127 millions in 1906 and 204 millions in 19 10. 
The number of horses in Bosnia in 1879 was 160,- 
CHDo; in 1895 it had increased to 237,000, while 
their number in Servia in 1906, that is eleven 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 49 

years later, amounted to only 172,000 head 
Neat cattle in Bosnia increased in the same time 
from 762,000 to 1,417,000 head; in Servia, on 
the other hand, the number as late as in 1906 was 
932,000 head. Bosnia contains thrice the num- 
ber of goats, many more sheep; only swine are 
slightly more numerous in Servia. If the amount 
of cattle in the provinces has since remained more 
or less stationary, the fact is chiefly owing to 
the ever increasing export of cattle to the Em- 
pire. Though Bosnia is a more mountainous and 
barren country than Servia and though the lat- 
ter's population is bigger by more than a mil- 
lion, the railways constructed in Bosnia were 
963 km. in length in 1902, while in Servia they 
measured only 562 km. in 1906. Similar is the 
proportion as to public roads and highways.^ For 
the provincial Diet, whose constituencies are di- 

*It is but fair to state that the division of landed property, 
the situation of the peasantry, seems better in the Kingdom, 
owing to special difficulties in the provinces; the redemption of 



50 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

vided according to religion, as being the decisive 
distinction in the land, the Catholics elect 30 mem- 
bers, the Mahometans 42, the Jews i and the 
Orthodox Servians 54 members, so that there is 
certainly no injustice done to the Orthodox. 

I do not mean to say that the Austrian Gov- 
ernment in treating Servia may never have made 
a mistake. But where is the Government to be 
found that never has made a mistake? Par- 
ticularly in a situation where intricate political 
and social problems had to be solved, where con- 
flicting interests — agrarian and commercial — de- 
manded satisfaction, where national and reli- 
gious questions had to be settled. 

How easy in comparison was the task of the 
Russian diplomatists! Separated from Servia 
by two interjacent countries — Roumania, and 
Bulgaria — with no commercial relations to speak 

the "Kmets," the replacement of tenants by or their change into 
freeholders in Bosnia is, however, going on at a very progres- 
sive rate. 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 51 

of/ no political problem or interest that inter- 
fered with her own, Russia, distant and uncon- 
cerned, had in reality no interests at all in Ser- 
via save those instilled by ambition; her agents 
therefore had only to bribe, to give promises, 
and to create difficulties for the Austrian Gov- 
ernment. 

Nothing is more easily stirred up in our days 
than Nationalist- feelings; and though only a 
small part even of the Orthodox Servians, that is 
of the minority of Servians living in Bosnia, 
Herzegovina, and Hungary could be misled, the 
Pan-Servian Propaganda, secretly and even 
openly encouraged and assisted by the Servian 
authorities, could not fail to lead to trouble. 

Servian hostility increased when Austria in 
1908 proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia and 

* Almost all the commerce of Servia is with Austria and Hun- 
gary; only a small part of the export trade goes to Italy and 
Egypt; 60 per cent, of imported goods come from Austria, the 
rest from Germany, France and other countries. 



52 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

Herzegovina to her Empire, though in doing so 
it changed only in form what had been an ac- 
compHshed fact since the Berlin Congress in 
1878. The Servian Government protested to the 
Powers against the annexation as a ''deep injury 
done to the feelings, interests, and rights of the 
Servian people." Now it always hurts the "feel- 
ings and interests" of a person or a people to 
see a thing definitely put into another man's pos- 
session which they crave for themselves ; but we 
are absolutely unable to conceive any right of 
Servia to possess these provinces, unless it be 
deduced from the fact that in the Middle Ages — 
some seven hundred years ago— Servian kings 
had ruled them and that a small part of the popu- 
lation are Orthodox Servians to this day. With 
much the same right Austria could claim a con- 
siderable part of Switzerland, because in the Mid- 
dle Ages it had been in her dominion and because 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 53 

a good part of the population are Germans and 
Catholics to this day? 

Austria had been commissioned to occupy the 
provinces by a European Congress; she had con- 
quered them by force of arms, not from the Ser- 
vians, remember, but from the Mahometans, their 
deadly enemies. She had given the provinces an 
excellent administration and brought them to a 
flourishing condition, such as they never had 
known before; she had reconciled the Mahome- 
tans living in those provinces and converted them 
into her most loyal subjects; she had invested 
immense capital — only a madman could imagine 
that she would ever give them up again. The 
annexation was but the official and formal ex- 
pression of an actual 3tate of things that had 
lasted since the Berlin Congress. Turkey, of 
course, had a formal right to protest against the 
annexation, but never Servia, And as to Turkey, 



54 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

Austria has since come to an agreement with her 
upon the subject 

All this has to be said because in the Intro- 
duction to the British Blue Book the annexa- 
tion of Bosnia is mentioned casually and in such 
a way as to create the impression that great 
wrong had been done to Servia, while all the real 
import of the event is carefully passed in silence. 

The Servians of Servia, however, stirred up 
by a highly nationalistic propaganda, became 
deeply incensed by the annexation, and their ir- 
ritation increased when, after their successes in 
the Balkan War in 191 2, Austria formally op- 
posed and prevented their being put into posses- 
sion of a port on the Adriatic. Everybody will, 
of course, understand their irritation on that 
head; yet Austria could not act otherwise with- 
out grievously damaging herself, so long as Ser- 
via acted as a vassal-state of Russia, blindly obey- 
ing the Russian Ambassador's orders. A Ser- 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 55 

vian port on the Adriatic would have served as 
a harbour to the fleet of any hostile power that 
was allied with Russia; the Franco-English fleet 
would have found in it an excellent point of sup- 
port in the present war. For this reason Austria 
could not consent to what she would willingly 
have granted to Servia if she had not only been 
her neighbour but also her friend. Under the 
actual conditions she could as little consent to 
such an acquisition being made by Servia as the 
United States could consent to a port near San 
Francisco being occupied by a power that was 
absolutely dependent on Japan. Otherwise Aus- 
tria presented no obstacle to the expansion of 
Servia, which during the last Balkan war had 
vastly increased its territory. 

After the murder of the last King of the house 
of Obrenovic the Russophile party acquired as- 
cendency in Belgrade, and the treasonable Pan- 
Servian agitation in the Austro-Hungarian 



56 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

provinces began to increase in violence. It may 
be sufficient to state that a Servian nationalist 
society in the kingdom, called the ''Narodna 
Ohrana" with which 762 sharpshooters' com- 
panies were affiliated, kept two schools in which 
armed bands — **komitatschis" — were trained in 
the art of throwing bombs, laying mines, blow- 
ing up railway-bridges and similar practices. 

In the paper edited by the "Narodna Ohrand' 
a "war of extermination'' was preached against 
Austria as being the "first and greatest enemy of 
the Servian race," 

Secret societies in Austria were organized; a 
particular organisation was founded among Ser- 
vian students in Austria for the purpose of 
"liberating the Slavs of the South" ; its statutes 
proclaimed that "revolution had to be prepared 
by acts of terrorism." In fact, a series of at- 
tempts on the life of high Austro-Hungarian of- 
ficials followed. 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 57 

On June 8, 1912, the Royal Commissary for 
Croatia, Baron Cuvaj, was wounded while driv- 
ing through the streets of Agram, and Councillor 
von Herwic, who was sitting in the same car, 
killed by a man called Jukic* The perpetrator 
of this crime had just returned from Belgrade, 
where he had been furnished with a bomb and 
a browning by an officer of the Servian army. 

On August 18, of the same year, a certain 
Stefan Dojcic made a similar attempt on the 
life of Commissary Baron Skerlecz. 

On May 2, 1913, Jacob Schafer tried to assas- 
sinate Baron Skerlecz, who in the meantime had 
been appointed Banus (Governor) of Croatia. 

Readers are also to bear in mind that the reign- 
ing King Peter of Servia owes his crown to the 
murder perpetrated on his predecessor, King 
Alexander. 

A certain Bogdan Serajic who had tried to as- 
sassinate the governor of Bosnia, General Baron 



58 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

Varesanin, was even glorified in Servian papers 
as a national hero. 

Assassination is in fact an established form of 
political agitation in Servia. 

In Servian school-books, nay, in the very guide- 
books which were sold to travellers and which 
are written in the German language, the Austro- 
Hungarian provinces are called the "parts of 
Servia which are not yet freed from the foreign 
yoke/^ The simplest Austrian students of Ser- 
vian race who came to visit Belgrade were sure 
to be received by the Servian Crown-Prince 
or at least by Servian generals. On the wall of 
the Servian war-office at Belgrade an allegory 
is painted representing an armed female on whose 
shield are written the names of the ''unredeemed" 
Austrian provinces. The schools in which the 
above-mentioned banditti were trained for fu- 
ture armed inroads into Austria were inspected 
at regular intervals by the President of the 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 59 

"Narodna Obrana/' the Servian general Boso 
Jankovic.^ 

This Pan-Servian movement was a serious 
danger because it tended to a dismemberment of 
the Empire and could not but lead to war. 

There has been a widespread though errone- 
ous notion in foreign countries that Austria was 
a state which threatened dissolution and which 
could not hold together much longer. Nothing 
could be more false than this idea which has 
proven one of the great mistakes of Austria's 
enemies. With all her political dissensions, her 
national difficulties, the dual monarchy, the Aus- 
tro-Hungarian Empire, is a unity, bound together 
by old historical ties and new economic interests, 
by an administration in most parts excellent, by 

^ See depositions of prisoners and witnesses during the trial 
in Sarajewo, particularly of Misko Jovanovics and Lazar 
Kranjcsevics, prisoners, examined on October 17; Trifko 
Krstanovics, witness, examined on October 20; depositions of 
Lazar Stanarincsics and Dragan Bublic, witnesses, read on Octo- 
ber 20 and 21. 



6o ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

a national army, and by a deep and universal 
feeling for the reigning house. The twelve or 
more races who form the population of the Em- 
pire are geographically so intermixed that ili 
would be difficult to sever them. If these races, 
whose population varies from i^/^ to 9 millions, 
were made independent, there would be endless 
internecine war between them. History has or- 
ganized them in the Austro-Hungarian Mon- 
archy, and though quarrelling — as parties will do 
in a country inhabited by a homogeneous popu- 
lation — they have learnt to understand their 
common interests, and they are ready to die, nay, 
they are actually giving their lives by thousands 
for the Empire that unites them through a com- 
mon bond. If the Federated Empire of Aus- 
tro-Hungary did not exist, it would have to be 
invented and constructed in order to save fli-e 
population of the fertile regions along the D^jft- 
ube from eternal war and anarchy. 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 6i 

Suddenly the Pan-Servian movement sprang 
a ferrible climax; the murder of Sarajevo sent 
its horrors through the Austro-Hungarian Em- 
pire, through all the world. 

In all Servian towns the news of the murder 
produced public rejoicing: In Belgrade, in 
Ueskub, in Nisch, people embraced each other 
in the streets, exclamations of joy were heard in 
the coffee-houses- The president of the local com- 
mittee of the Narodna Obrana in Nisch made a 
speech in which he said : "Servia has been saved 
by this deed, and one of those who were dan- 
gerous to her is out of the way. Now Servia 
will have peace for several years, for the new 
heir of the Austrian throne will beware of walk- 
ing in the steps of his predecessor!" (Reports 
of Austro-Hungarian Consuls, etc. Red Book 
No. I, 2, 3, 5, lo, End. lo.) 

The Austrian Government waited till the in- 
iquiry had proven that the murderers of the Arch- 



62 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

duke had not only been furnished with bombs ^ 
and pistols from the Servian State Arsenal at 
Kragujewac, but also had been instructed in the 
use of these arms by Servian officers, particu- 
larly by Major Tankosic; that one of them, Ca- 
brinowic, the man who threw the bomb at the 
Archduke's automobile, had had an audience 
given to him by the Servian Crown-Prince Alex- 
ander ; that the murderers had been led over the 
Bosnian border by Servian police officers, etc.^ 
Only when all this had been proven beyond 

^The bombs were of the particular kind of hand-grenades 
used in the Servian army. 

^ One cannot help feeling pity for these poor misled boys who 
perpetrated the deed, and indignation toward those who cow- 
ardly thrust them into crime and misery, when one reads the 
last words which one of them, Nedelko Cabrinowic, uttered at 
the end of the trial. He said that the idea of murdering the 
Archduke had not originated in their own minds; that they had 
been taught in Belgrade to look upon such a deed as noble and 
beautiful ; that they were all sorry for it, though Gawrilo Princip 
might choose to take a hero's attitude ; that they had not known 
that the Archduke had children; that they repented what they 
had done and implored pardon of the children; that they were 
no criminals, but had sacrificed themselves for what they be- 
lieved to be a good cause. 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 63 

a doubt, only then did the Austrian Government 
present the well-known ultimatum to Servia, on 
July 24. Unquestionably by this action absolute 
submission from Servia was intended. A de- 
served submission and a necessary one. The 
English and the Russian Ambassadors at Vi- 
enna repeatedly said in their telegrams, that they 
''thought" or ''had heard" that the German Am- 
bassador in Vienna, Herr von Tschirschky^^ had 
advised the Austrian Government to be severe.^ 
There is, however, not the slightest evidence of 
the fact that the German Ambassador really did 
so, at any rate there was no need of such advice. 

^In a note of July 22d the French Ambassador, M. Dumaine, 
declares, without however giving proof of any kind (Yellow 
Book No. 18), that Herr von Tschirschky expressed his inclina- 
tion to violent measures against Servia, giving at the same time 
to understand that his Government were not quite of his opinion. 
No place nor date being given, the acting French Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, M. Bienvenu-Martin, in a note dated on the 
following day (Yellow Book No. 20) added — as a piece of evi- 
dence aflforded by his creative fancy — that Herr von Tschirschky 
had made utterances of this kind in "the diplomatic circles of 
Vienna." 



64 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

Austria had tolerated only too lopf what no other 
state could or would have tolerated, and she had 
done so for the sole reason that the old Emperor 
wished to end his reign in peace. Now things 
could be tolerated no longer. Indignation was 
running high at the court, in the church, in 
the press, through the whole people. There is 
no nation in the world that would not and has 
not made war on less provocation. There is no 
monarchy in the world that would permit the 
heir-apparent of the throne to be murdered with 
the guilty connivance of another country's gov- 
ernment without making war on that country^ un- 
less the most perfect, the most humble, the most 
instantaneous atonement was offered. There is 
no Power in the world that would have tolerated 
another Power's intercession in such a case. Sup- 
posing that the Russian Czarewitsch or the Vice- 
roy of India had been murdered by Afghans 
with the connivance of the Afghan Court and 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 65 

Government — I most humbly beg Afghanistan's 
pardon for the supposition — what would the Rus- 
sian, what would the English Government have 
done, what penance, what atonement would they 
have asked or accepted, especially if the murder 
had been but the climax of many that had gone 
before! Would they really have been contented 
with "concern and regret,'' as Sir Edward Grey 
proposed Servia ought to express?^ It was a 
useless task for diplomats to analyze and criticize 
the answer which the Servian Government gave 
to the Austrian note, on July 25, and to discuss 
how far it could be considered as satisfactory or 
as the basis of further negotiations. It could not 
be considered at all, because only absolute sub- 
mission was intended. Moreover, the answer 
was for the most part evasive. Besides, Servian 
promises had been given before and had always 

^In his note to the British Charge d'Aif aires at Belgrade of 
July 24, Blue Book No. 12. 



66 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

proved ineffective and unreliable/ The whole 
Servian note, even the apparent concessions 
which it contained, were in fact a mockery; for 
while it was handed to the Austrian Ambassador 
in Belgrade, Baron Giesl, at 6 o'clock on July 
25, at 3 o'clock on the same day the Servian Gov- 
ernment had issued the order for general mobili- 
sation. (Notes of Baron Giesl to Count Berch- 
told of July 25; of Count Berchtold to Count 
Mensdorff of July 26. Red Book No. 22, 23, 29.) 
And what nation will accept a few promises to 
take care in the future if possible, as a satis- 
faction for the murder of the chief representa- 
tive of the State, the Heir to the Crown? How 

*Only one small instance: On July 25 the British Charge 
d'Affaires at Belgrade, Mr. Crackanthorpe, telegraphed to Sir 
Edward Grey: 'The Servian Government have already arrested 
the officer referred to in the Austrian note." I have no doubt 
that Mr. Crackanthorpe had been informed to that effect; but 
in fact Major Tankosic has never been arrested. He was al- 
lowed to escape, and later he returned to Belgrade. Afterwards 
he was severely wounded, fighting in the Servian ranks, and is 
now lying in a hospital at Nisch. 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 67 

often have the guns of British warships thun- 
dered at foreign ports because a British subject's 
storehouse had been plundered or his bills re- 
fused ? 

On July 26y war between Austria and Servia 
became inevitable. It would have been "lo- 
calised/' that is to say, it would have remained 
a war between Austria and Servia but for the in- 
tervention of Russia. 

This fact is the nucleus, and at the same time 
the explanation of the war that is now ruining 
so many peaceful and flourishing countries ; it is 
the cause of such immense bloodshed, and it is 
almost needless to follow the stages of the diplo- 
matic Calvary that led to the outbreak of the 
greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen. 

Servians unsatisfactory reply would never 
have been given but for the advice of the same 
persons who had encouraged all the Servian pro- 
ceedings which led to the final catastrophe. On 



68 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

the very day on which the Austrian note was com- 
municated to the Servian Government, July 23, 
the Crown-Prince-Regent of Servia wrote an im- 
ploring letter to the Czar. (Published in the Rus- 
sian Orange Book as No. 10.) We do not know 
whether the telegram from St. Petersburg with 
the short and energetic advice "Mobilize ! we are 
mobilizing also !'' was really sent from St. Peters- 
burg to Belgrade, or whether it represents only 
one of those happy historical legends which origi- 
nate on the spot and, though not absolutely cor- 
rect, are highly expressive of the actual situa- 
tion. 

It is certainly most astonishing that the Rus- 
sian Orange Book observes an absolute silence on 
the notes exchanged between the Russian and 
Servian Governments during the important 
forty-eight hours which elapsed between the mo- 
ment of the communication of the Austrian Ul- 
timatum in Belgrade and the Servian Reply. The 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 69 

official Russian publication contains nothing bu£ 
the answer given by the Czar to the Crown-Prince 
(No. 40), which was not written until July 27^ 
It is evident that the Russian Government does: 
not wish to have it known by the public of Eu- 
rope or America what advice it gave to Servia 
in those critical days, and its silence is a confes- 
sion of its guilt. But for Russia's encouragement 
Servia would have been forced to yield and to 
give Austria the satisfaction desired; thus might 
even the war between Austria and Servia have 
been avoided. 

That the Russian Government was from the 
very first considering war against Austria — • 
which, as it knew, meant war against Germany 
also — is proven by an important passage in a note 
from Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at 
St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey, on July 24 
(Brit. Blue Book No. 6), according to which the 
Ambassador declared to M. Sazonof, as his per- 



70 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

sonal opinion, that ''an unconditional engagement 
on the British Government's part to support Rus- 
sia and France by force of arms was not to be 
expected." The Ambassador then asked whether, 
if Austria proceeded to embark on miHtary meas- 
ures against Servia, it was the intention of the 
Russian Government forthwith to declare war 
on Austria? Thereupon M. Sazonof answered 
that the ''Russian mobilisation would at any rate 
have to be carried out" and that "a decision would 
be come to" probably on the next day at a council 
which the Czar would preside. In his next note, 
dated July 25 (Bl. B. Note No. 17), the Brit- 
ish Ambassador says that he expressed the 
earnest hope that "Russia would not precipitate 
war by mobilising until Sir Edward Grey had 
had time to use his influence in favour of peace," 
whereupon M. Sazonof assured him that "Russia 
had no aggressive intentions, and she would take 
no action until it was forced upon her. Austria's 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 71 

action was in reality directed against Russia. 
She aimed at overthrowing the present status 
quo in the Balkans, and establishing her own 
hegemony there. He did not believe that Ger- 
many really wanted war, but her attitude would 
be decided by ours (the British attitude) . . .'' 
Sir G. Buchanan concludes with the following 
words : — ''I said all I could to impress prudence 
on the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and warned 
him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would 
not be content with mere mobilisation, or give 
Russia time to carry out hers, but would prob- 
ably declare war at once. His Excellency re- 
plied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush 
Servia and become the predominant Power in 
the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the sup- 
port of France, she will face all the risks of war. 
He assured me once more that he did not wish 
to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany 



72 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

could restrain Austria I could regard the situa- 
tion as desperate." 

This is plain language. It proves several in- 
teresting things. First that English statesmen 
in the beginning of the crisis stood aghast at 
the possible consequences and were not desirous 
of a general conflict at that moment, while on 
the contrary Russia was quite resolute now to 
'"face all the risks of war." The conversation 
reported in the note proves further that even 
the Russian Minister, according to his own words, 
Hid not believe that Germany wanted war, and 
that even the English Ambassador recognized 
the necessity which would compel Germany to 
declare war if Russia mobilised. 
, When, on July 23, Sir Edward Grey had at- 
'tempted to explain to the Austrian Ambassador 
at London, Count Mensdorff, how terrible the 
consequences of the ultimatum might be. Count 
Mensdorff had answered, that "all depended on 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 7.I 

Russia." This was so very clear that even Sir 
Edward Grey could only give a diplomatic an- 
swer which said nothing at all. Sir G. Buchanan 
had stated to M. Sazonof that ''direct British 
interests in Servia were nil'' ; the same might be 
said of France; Germany had repeatedly declared 
that she had no interest there. There was an un- 
questionable conflict between Austria and Ser- 
via because the latter had instigated a revolu- 
tionary movement on Austro-Hungarian terri- 
tory and had sent out murderers who had killed 
the heir apparent of the throne. The Austrian 
Government had declared in the most formal 
manner that it did not aim at territorial aggran- 
dizernent in Servia. All this was so very clear 
that Sir Edward Grey had found nothing to say 
in answer to Count Mensdorff, and Russian diplo- 
matists could only note the ''icy indifference'' 
with which Servian complaints met in English 
official circles. In fact, the British Ambassador 



74 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

in Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, said to Count 
Berchtold as late as on July 28: ''The English 
Government have followed the development of 
the crisis with great interest and wish to assure 
the Austrian Government that they feel all sym- 
pathy for their standpoint and perfectly under- 
stand their griefs against Servia." (Red Book 
No. 41.) There was at that time nobody in the 
diplomatic world — or indeed anywhere at all — 
who did not see and feel that all depended on Rus- 
sia. 

When, however, in the course of the next days 
or rather hours — so quickly the situation de- 
veloped into a crisis — it became clear that Russia 
intended to interfere, France and England, her 
allies, at once altered their view ; things suddenly 
ceased to depend on Russia, and the responsi- 
bility was quickly shuffled off to Germany. They 
found out that Germany was bound to exert an 
influence upon Austria in order to make her 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 75 

change her measures as far as they gave dis- 
pleasure to Russia. 

On July 24, the German Ambassador in St. 
Petersburg, Count Pour tales, informed the 
Chancellor that M. Sazonof had "indulged in 
immoderate accusations against Austria and had 
declared in the most positive way that Russia 
could by no means permit the Austro-Servian 
difference to be settled between the two parties 
alone." (Tel. of July 24, German White Book 
No. 4.) Thereupon the French Government 
changed its tone.^ 

' In an article in the "Figaro" entitled "Un Faux Allemand," 
M. Denys Cochin, the well-known Royalist member of the French 
Chamber of Deputies, declared that the date of Count Pour- 
tales' telegram, as given in the White Book, must needs be a 
falsification, the Russian threats having not been uttered until 
a Russian demand for prolongation of the time-limit in the Aus- 
trian Ultimatum had been refused by the Austrian Government. 
He concludes this from the fact that this Russian demand is 
quoted in the Russian Orange Book (No. 15) as dated July 24. 
In fact, the falsification — it may, of course, be an error due to 
Russian inexactness — is to be found in the Russian Orange Book, 
and M. Denys Cochin is in error in all his statements. The 
Russian demand for a prolongation of the time-limit was tele- 



76 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

This change in the attitude of the EngHsh and 
French Cabinets was very curious and impor- 
tant. 

The situation was perfectly clear. If France 
and England, who had no interests at all at stake 
in Servia, accepted the Russian view, for the 
sole reason that Russia was their friend and ally, 

graphed by the Russian Charge d'Affaires in Vienna, Prince 
Koudascheff, to Count Berchtold, who had left for Ischl to 
confer with the Emperor on July 2$. The negative answer, 
therefore, could not possibly reach the Russian Embassy in 
Vienna, and still less the Foreign Office at St. Petersburg, until 
later in the course of the day (July 25), while the Russian 
threats had been published by the Viennese papers in their 
morning editions of the same day. It is, therefore, quite evident 
that the threatening utterances of the Russian Cabinet must 
needs have been made before and not after the demand for a 
prorogation of the time-limit, the refusal of which demand they 
and their French friend now wish to pass off as the cause of 
their hostile attitude. 

The attempt to find such an excuse is the more preposterous, 
as in a note of the French Ambassador at Vienna, M. Dumaine, 
to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs of July 25 (published 
in the French Yellow Book as No. 45), not only the real date 
of the telegrams (two having been sent, one to reach Count 
Berchtold on his way, and one to Ischl) is stated as being the 
25th of July — ^but the confession is added that Prince Kouda- 
scheff did not expect that his telegrams would have the slightest 
effect; literally: '7/ n'en attend aucun effet." 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 77 

why should Germany not be allowed to take the 
side of her friend and ally Austria, whom she 
knew, moreover, to be perfectly in the right? 
Why should she also be bound to accept the views 
of Russia, who was neither her friend nor her 
ally and whom she knew to be thoroughly in 
the wrong? Austria had the greatest interest 
in a decisive and final solution of the difficulties 
produced by Servian agitation and assassinations. 
Austria had been frightfully wronged; if her 
Government desisted from exacting necessary 
reparation, Austria would become an object of 
contempt to the Balkans as well as to her own 
population. Why then should Germany be bound 
to give her advice which she must needs know 
to be bad, and which would never be accepted 
unless the German Government exerted such pres- 
sure as to do irreparable harm to her faithful 
[friend and ally ! It may be that such an estrange- 
ment between the two central Powers was one of 



78 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

the objects in view; Russia, at any rate, had been 
wronged by nobody, no revolutionary agitation 
in her provinces had been encouraged, no grand- 
duke had been killed; nobody had asked anything 
of her but to keep quiet — and because Russia 
would not keep quiet but chose to threaten with 
war, Germany was bound to accept the Russian 
view, and when she refused to do so, her "atti- 
tude was most alarming !" 

The demand was the most preposterous that 
could be imagined. In the Introduction to the 
British Blue Book it is said: "At this critical 
moment everything depended on Germany." But 
not the slightest reason is advanced to prove this 
statement. The author of the Introduction, who- 
soever he be, follows up with the words: "As 
the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said a 
little later, 'the key of the situation was to be 
found in Berlin.' " Now this is a repetition of 
the same phrase but not a proof. Is anything a 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 79 

truth because a Russian Minister says so?' I 
think that since the time of old Potemkin the 
augurs themselves would smile at such a sugges- 
tion. 

We ask again: why did everything depend on 
Germany? Had Germany threatened anybody? 
Did she refuse to keep quiet, as Russia did ? She 
only refused to give advice which would be det- 
rimental to Austria, or to exert pressure on her, 
just because Russia pleased to desire it. Sir 
Edward Grey says he confessed that he felt help- 
less. In the Introduction to the Blue Book he 
or his deputy who wrote it says that "there was 
no time to advise Russia." Why was there no 
time for doing so ? And if there was not time for 
England to advise Russia, who had not yet fixed 
any time-limit or come to a final decision, how 
could there be time for Germany to advise Aus- 
tin the French Yellow Book the same thing is repeated of 
«^se,^over and over again, without ever !ny re^nti^ 



8o ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

tria, who had made her final decision and fixed 
a time-Hmit from which she could not withdraw 
without making herself ridiculous? I am afraid 
Sir Edward will have to answer with Sir John 
Falstaff: ''If reasons were as plenty as black- 
berries, I would not give a man a reason upon 
compulsion, I." 

It may be important to add just here that Ger- 
many, though refusing to ''put pressure on the 
authorities at Vienna" — this was literally asked 
from her by Sir Edward Grey (cf. Brit. Blue 
Book No. 112) — nevertheless did her best to in- 
fluence Austria in the direction desired. She not 
only forwarded the English propositions to the 
Austrian Foreign Office, but she also did her ut- 
most to facilitate direct negotiations between the 
Russian and the Austrian Cabinets; finally the 
German Emperor appealed to the Czar. The 
Austrian Red Book contains as No. 44 a note 
communicated by Count Berchtold to the Aus- 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 8ii 

trian Ambassadors in London, St. Petersburg, 
Paris and Rome on July 29, informing them of 
the Austrian Government's being forced to de- 
cline, much to its regret, the English proposi- 
tions forwarded to it by the German Ambassa- 
dor, Herr von Tschirschky; and under No. 47 
a note of Count Szapary, Austrian Ambassador 
in St. Petersburg, in which he informs Count 
Berchtold of conciliatory steps taken by the Ger- 
man Ambassador, Count Pourtales. Proof of 
Germany's earnestness of effort in this direction 
is afforded not only by the published notes but by 
a most unimpeachable witness, the Belgian 
Charge d' Affaires in St. Petersburg, M. 
d'Escailles, who wrote to his Government on July 
30: "It is undeniable that Germany has tried 
here (in St. Petersburg) as well as in Vienna 
to find some expedient to avoid a general war.''^ 

' Quoted from a letter which was sent by post to the covered 
address of "Madame Costermans in Brussels" and which, while 
traversing Germany, was confiscated by the German authorities 



82 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

The Introduction to the British Blue Book was 
of necessity written post festiim. In the notes 
themselves as collected in the Blue Book this 
shuffling off of the responsibility from Russia to 
Germany is evident to all eyes, and all the art 
employed in arranging them is insufficient to 
hide it. Some pretext, however, had to be found, 
an interest of Russia had to be constructed which 
forced her to interfere. As such an interest did 
not exist in reality, it had to be founded on a 
fiction. The fiction was ready at hand. As early 
as on July 24, Sir Edward Grey had written to 
Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, that 
"Russia would be compelled by her public opinion 
to take action as soon as Austria attacked Ser- 
via." The same argument is repeated in several 
English notes during the following days, and — 

after hostilities had begun. The envelope, being opened, proved 
to contain a letter to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 83 

if I am not mistaken — it was even brought forth 
in the English House of Parliament. 

Public opinion in Russia! If public opinion 
had aught to say in Russia, would the present 
Government, the whole present system of gov- 
ernment, exist one day longer? "Russian public 
opinion'' is a mannikin which is put forth when- 
ever the Russian Government chooses not to as- 
sume the responsibility of certain acts, but lifeless 
and utterly unable to ask for anything of its own 
accord. Whenever real public opinion in Russia 
dares to utter wishes which displease the Gov- 
ernment, the newspaper is suppressed; whenever 
it dares to lift its voice in meetings, it is trodden 
down by Cossacks. "Public opinion" in Russia, 
as quoted by M. Sazonof or by Sir Edward Grey, 
means newspaper-articles, commanded by the 
Government or printed by its leave ; it is a thing 
compelled, not a thing compelling. Sir Edward 
Grey is, of course, not so ignorant that he would 



84 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

not be aware of this fact; but the average British 
newspaper-reader is grossly ignorant of the state 
of foreign countries, and, knowing public opin- 
ion to be a real power in his own country, he 
might easily be made to believe that the Russian 
Government, however loath to disturb the world's 
peace, were indeed forced to intercede. Thus the 
fiction of ''Russian public opinion" is used as a 
means to deceive English public opinion. 

There stands, however, behind this fiction an 
idea, known to all the world and widespread in 
certain parts of Russian society, an idea that is 
itself a fiction, a monstrous fiction in European 
politics. Fictions, as we all know, may be power- 
ful agents in history, and, as their power is based 
on their being taken for truths, it is time to show 
that this fiction is but a dangerous sham. It is the 
fiction of Pan-Slavism, the fiction that Russia is 
destined by "divine mission'' to unite all Slavic 
nations under her kind and beneficent rule. It 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 85 



was in the name of the Pan-Slavist idea or fiction 
that Russia felt herself bound to intercede for 
Servia. Now, if the Pan-Slavist idea were one 
of love and brotherhood among all Slavs, it 
should be welcome. However, the so-called Pan- 
Slavism is in reality but a euphemistic term for 
the Pan-Russian idea, Pan-Moskovitism. The 
Slavic nations who have fallen victim to Russia's 
divine mission, the Poles, the Ukrainians, have 
felt this fact with vengeance. Hanging, tor- 
turing, banishment, deprivation of all political 
rights, fiercest oppression, forbidding of their 
very language and religion, whipping of men and 
violation of women by hundreds because they 
would not turn Orthodox, has been the lot of 
those blessed with Russian Pan-Slavism. Read 
the English consuls' reports from Poland which 
have been published. Ask the Poles, the Ukrain- 
ians, ask the Russians themselves what they 
think of their Government. Ask the Poles, the 



86 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

Circassians, the Georgians, the Fins and what- 
soever other nation has undergone the horrible 
fate of being incorporated in the Russian Empire. 
Russia protect other Slav states and their inde- 
pendence! Is it not grotesque? Is it not like 
Medea wishing to adopt other people's children, 
and alleging the brilliant treatment she gave her 
own! 

Let the Russian Government first free its own 
subjects from constant oppression and from inef- 
fable suffering before it pretends to liberate other 
nations ! Let the Czar first keep his oath to re- 
spect the constitution and independence of Fin- 
land, before he dare intercede for the indepen- 
dence of Servia! Let him set free thousands of 
his own innocent subjects who are dying a slow 
death in the prisons on the Lake of Ladoga or 
in the deserts of Siberia before he presumes to 
protect the ringleaders of the crime that was per- 
petrated in Sarajewo! 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 87 



It was by chance that the monstrous treachery 
which is hiding under the name of the '^Divine 
Mission" of Russia was unveiled to some of its 
destined victims and to all the world, — as far as 
it has eyes to see— during the second Balkan 
War. The Balkan League had been framed, the 
Balkan War had been instigated by Russian Di- 
plomacy. But when the Russian Government 
saw that the Bulgarians, one of the favoured na- 
tions set free by Russia, were too victorious, that 
they threatened to become too strong and to 
conquer, sooner or later, the Turkish Capital 
whose possession was coveted by Russia herself, 
it changed its attitude toward them. All the 
world looked on with astonishment while the Rus- 
sian protectors delivered the Bulgarians up into 
the hands of the Servians, their "brethren" and 
enemies of old, and even into the hands of those 
races who were the natural enemies of the Slavic 
race in the Balkans— the Roumanian and the 



88 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

Greek. They remained passive spectators of the 
war in which their beloved "brethren'' butchered 
and weakened each other and through which Bul- 
garia in particular was humbled and deprived of 
the best part of her conquests. This was the true 
face of Russian Pan-Slavism. The crime, as 
crimes so often are, was at the same time a blun- 
der. The Balkan League fell to pieces, and the 
million of Balkan warriors ceased to number in 
the calculations of the Triple Entente for the 
present war. The Bulgarians, betrayed as they 
were, turned into Austria's and even Turkey's 
devoted friends. 

Of the mixed populations of 48 millions which 
inhabit Austria-Hungary, about 23 millions be- 
long to the Slavic race. They are more numer- 
ous than the inhabitants belonging to any other 
race. In the Austrian Parliament the members 
elected by them form the majority. There are al- 
ways two or three ministers of Slavic nationality 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 89 

in the Austrian cabinet. The murdered Arch- 
duke had married a lady from an old Slavic 
house. Generals of Slavic blood are leading th^ 
Austro-Hungarian armies into battle against the 
Russians. Even in Hungary where the Slavs 
form a much smaller percentage of the popula- 
tion and are not so well treated as in Austria, 
they still enjoy rights surpassing the boldest 
dreams of those who live under Russian rule. 
Almost all the Slav peoples in Austria and Hun- 
gary may boast of a University where the lectures 
are given in their own language, where rector, 
council and professors are of their nationality: — 
there is a Tschech University in Prague, a Polish 
University in Krakaw, a Polish and Ruthenian 
one in Lemberg, a Croatian University in Agram, 
a Tschech College of Engineering in Briinn, etc. ; 
that they have their own Latin schools and high 
schools, not to speak of grammar-schools, is a 
matter of course. No Slavic nation under Rus- 



90 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

sian rule enjoys the privilege of having a Uni- 
versity of her own. At the University of War- 
saw, the capital of Poland, all the lectures are 
given in the Russian language, Polish lectures are 
strictly forbidden ; and the same is the case in all 
lower schools. Austria might call herself with 
infinitely more right than Russia, a friend of the 
Slavic races. 

Russian Pan-Slavism is but a cover, a smiling 
mask for the expansion of the Russian empire, 
for the rapacious desire of making sooner or later 
a prey of the other nations around her, while it 
is a matter of perfect indifference to her whether 
these nations be Slav or German or Finnish or 
Chinese. 

This constant tendency of the Russian Empire 
to expand has become a sort of political axiom. 
And there are writers, there are historians, who 
have accepted this axiom and who repeat that it 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 91 

is a necessity for Russia to expand. This proves 
again that if there is a person bold enough to 
state with a certain emphasis the most evident 
falsehood, other people will repeat it, and after 
a time it will be accepted as a truth of which there 
is no further need of proof. Is it because she 
owns the vastest territory with the thinnest popu- 
lation ^ that Russia is forced to expand ? Or 
because in this immense territory there are the 
vastest stretches of soil not yet cultivated while 
even those which are devoted to agriculture ^ are 
far from being reasonably and thoroughly ex- 
ploited? Or does it seem needful to expand her 
Government because her administration is most 
corrupted, oppressive, and incapable? Is it a 
reason to expand that she has already rendered so 
many nations the most unhappy on earth? I 

^19 inhabitants to the square kilometer (1.3 in the Asiatic 
possessions) to "jo. in France, 87 in Austria, 120 in Germany. 

^2<S per cent, of the whole territory to 35 per cent, in Austria, 
46 per cent, in Germany, 48 per cent, in France. 



92 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

think it is time for a Government like this to 
withdraw, to wither, but not to expand ! 

Russia has no real interest at stake in the Bal- 
kans. Her commerce with them — import as well 
as export — is quite insignificant. Her moral or 
ideal interest in them is a sham. All her interest 
in the Balkans is to intrigue against Austria and 
Turkey. It is purely destructive. I may, of 
course, call it an interest in my neighbour's house 
when I want to steal it. 

In this sense Russia has an interest of old 
standing in Constantinople and in the Darda- 
nelles ; but how much more evident is in that case 
the interest of Italy in Malta or that of Spain in 
Gibraltar? 

The statesmen of the Triple Entente knew in 
advance that the Russian standpoint could not be 
accepted by Austria. The British Ambassador 
at Vienna wrote to Sir Edward Grey on July 26 : 
'1 had the French and Russian Ambassadors both 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 93 



with me . . . They doubted whether the principle 
of Russia being an interested party entitled to 
have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro- 
Servian dispute would be accepted by either the 
Austro-Hungarian or the German Government/' 
(Brit. Blue Book No. 40, p. 26.) 
So it was, nor could it be otherwise. 
On July 2S, Austria declared war on Servia. 
It seems that during the next forty-eight 
hours all the statesmen concerned, the Rus- 
sian excepted, were in earnest in their wish 
to ''localize" the conflict. A conference of 
the Powers was suggested, but here again 
the measures proposed were strangely incon- 
sistent and illogical. The Italian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, the late Marchese di San 
Giuliano, made what should seem an excellent 
proposition; he said that ''he saw no possibility of 
Austria receding from any point laid down in her 
note to Servia, but he believed that if Servia 



94 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

would even now accept it, Austria would be satis^ 
fied, and if she had reason to think such would be 
the advice of the Powers, Austria might defeii 
action. Servia might be induced to accept the 
note in its entirety on the advice of the four Pow- 
ers invited to the conference, and this would en- 
able her to say that she had yielded to Europe and 
not to Austria-Hungary alone." (Note of Sir 
Renell Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to 
Sir Edward Grey of July 2y, 1914; Brit. Blue 
Book No. 57, p. 35.) It is obvious that the Italian 
statesman would not have made this proposition 
without having previously made sure of Austria's 
agreement. It does not seem, however, to have 
been accepted by the other Powers. Russia did 
not want a conference to make Servia give way 
but to humble Austria. Was it not once more a 
most preposterous demand, that the great state 
which had been wronged should be forced to yield 
to a conference, while the small state which had 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 95 

wronged and which, being small, had no such 
■^'prestige'' to lose, should be spared the same? 
Was it not inevitable that Austria should decline 
a conference which, as she clearly saw, would 
be called only to decide against her ? How could 
she accept for herself what Russia would not ac- 
cept for Servia? 

We have stated our belief that, at this moment, 
the English statesmen were serious in their ef- 
forts to preserve peace. We infer this from the 
'fact that, unless they could show that they had 
done their utmost in that direction, they knew 
they would have a bad stand in the English Par- 
liament. They had prepared war for years past, 
they had assembled their fleet at Spithead; still 
they had reason to think that the present moment 
was not so favorable for a general war against 
Germany as a later time might be. That Ger- 
many was sincere is proved by the utterances of 
English statesmen, as contained in the British 



96 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

Blue Book/ All attempts, sincere or not, to 
preserve peace, were, however, rendered vain by- 
Russia's going on with her mobilisation. Things 
came to pass exactly as the British Ambassador 
at St. Petersburg, Sir G. Buchanan, had pre- 
dicted, when, on July 25, he had "warned the 
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs that if Rus- 
sia mobilised, Germany would not be content with 
mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry 
out hers, but probably declare war at once." 
(British Blue Book No. 17, p. 16.) Germany, by 
the express terms of the Treaty of Alliance, was 
bound to defend Austria; nor could she leave the 
long stretched border of East-Prussia, which is 
not protected by any fortress, defenceless 
against a sudden invasion by Russian troops. It 
was obviously impossible to suffer Russia to mo- 
bilise in peace and to wait patiently for the mo- 
ment when she might be pleased to declare war. 

^cfr. pp. 25 and 107-8 of this study. 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 97 

England was informed of this. On July 31, Sir 
Edward Goschen telegraphed to Sir Edward 
Grey: ''Chancellor informs me that his efforts 
to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have 
been seriously handicapped by the Russian mo- 
bilisation against Austria. He has done every- 
thing possible to attain his object at Vienna, per- 
haps even rather more than was altogether pala- 
table at the Ballplatz. He could not, however, 
leave his country defenceless while time was be- 
ing utilised by other Powers ; and if, as he learns 
is the case, military measures are now being taken 
by Russia against Germany also, it would be im- 
possible for him to remain quiet. He wished to 
tell me that in very short time, to-day perhaps, 
the German Government would take some very 
serious step ; he was, in fact, just on the point of 
going to have an audience with the Emperor." 
(British Blue Book No. 108, p. 59.) 
Russia, who from the beginning had said that 



98 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

"if she felt secure of the support of France, she 
would face all the risks of war," was now fast 
driving toward it. On July 29, two days before 
Sir E. Goschen's conversation with the German 
Chancellor, M. Sazonof had written to M. Isvol- 
skij: "As we are unable to fulfil the wishes of 
Germany, there is nothing left to us but to arm 
and to count on war, which is inevitable. Inform 
French Government of this." (Russ. Orange 
Book No. 58.) That Russia, while driving to- 
ward war herself, should try to cast the respon- 
sibility on Germany — being assisted in this by the 
Governments and Press of her allies — may be a 
natural stratagem. But the way in which the 
Russian Government tried to deceive the German 
Government concerning her real intentions and 
attitude was distinctly Oriental in its method. 

The German Emperor who had returned from 
Norway on July 26, sent a telegram to the Czar 
on July 28, in which he expressed his opinion on 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 



99 



the Servian crime, and represented to the Czar 
that it was their common interests as sovereigns 
not to suffer those who were responsible for it 
to remain unpunished. He assured the Czar that 
he was using his whole influence in Vienna to 
come to a peaceful agreement with Russia, and 
gave expression to the hope that in this he would 
be assisted by the Czar himself. To this tele- 
gram the Czar gave answer on the following day, 
imploring the German Emperor to help him— 
"shameful war had been declared on a feeble 
country"; he would not be able to resist the pres- 
sure which was being put on him, and would 
be forced to take measures which might lead 
to war. "To prevent such a disaster, I implore 
you in the name of old friendship to do all that 
is in your power to prevent your ally from going 
too far.'' The Emperor answered on the same 
day that he could not consider Austria's proceed- 
ing shameful; that Servia's promises on paper 



loo ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

had always proved worthless ; that the Austrian 
Cabinet having solemnly declared that it would 
not aim at territorial aggrandisement at Servians 
expense, Russia might very well remain an on- 
looker without drawing Europe into the most hor- 
rible war which ever had been. His Government 
was doing its utmost to bring about a direct un- 
derstanding between Russia and Austria, but 
such mediation would be made impossible by mili- 
tary measures on Russia's part. Such measures 
would be apt to hasten a calamity which both 
monarchs wished to prevent. 

The Emperor sent a second telegram on the 
next day (July 30) which ran thus: ''My Am- 
bassador has been instructed to call Your Gov- 
ernment's attention to the dangers and the heavy 
consequences of a mobilisation; I told you the 
same in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has 
mobilised only against Servia and but a part of 
her army. If Russia mobilises against Austria- 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR loi 

Hungary, as, according to your and your Gov- 
ernment's information, is the case, my part as a 
mediator with which you kindly entrusted me and 
which I accepted upon your particular wish, will 
be rendered difficult if not hopeless. The whole 
grave decision lies now with you — you will be re- 
sponsible for peace or war. William." To this 
the Czar answered on the same day, twenty min- 
utes later : "1 thank you with all my heart for 
your ready answer. I am sending Tatitscheff to- 
night with instructions. The military measures 
which are now taking place were decided on five 
days ago but only as a defence against Austria's 
preparations. I hope with all my heart that these 
measures will in no way influence your mediation, 
which I appreciate very much. We need your 
strong pressure on Austria in order to make her 
come to an agreement with us. Nicolaus.'' 

These five telegrams have been published in the 



I02 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

German White Book as No. 20, 21, 22, 23, 23a. 
They are carefully left out in the Russian Or- 
ange Book. 

Was it not deceit of the highest degree for the 
Czar to send such a telegram — or may we suppose 
that he was deceived himself and used as a screen 
by those who wielded the real power — while Rus- 
sia was already mobilising on every side ? Was 
it not an outrage to say that this was a measure 
of defence against Austria while Austria had 
mobilised only a few corps against Servia? But 
what is still more noteworthy is that the Czar 
telegraphed on July 30 that measures had been 
decided on five days before, — that would be on 
July 25 — while, on July 2y, the German Ambas- 
sador at St. Petersburg had telegraphed to the 
Chancellor: "The War Minister (Suchom- 
linow) gave his word of honour to the German 
Military Attache that no order of mobilisation 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR lo-? 

had been issued, that no man of the reserve had 
been called up, not a horse levied'/'^ (German 
White Book No. ii.) 

On the next day, July 31, "danger of war" was 
proclaimed in Germany, and an ultimatum was 
despatched to Russia, demanding that she should 
countermand her mobilisation within twelve 
hours. A note was also sent to France, demand- 
ing within eighteen hours an answer as to wheth- 
er, in case of war between Germany and Russia, 
she would remain neutral. 

Russia's sole answer was the interruption of 
the telegraphic communication between the Ger- 
man Ambassador in St. Petersburg and his Gov- 
ernment. 

* How shamelessly Russian officials will say the contrary of 
manifest truth may be inferred from the following fact: The 
Russian Ambassador in Switzerland declared in a letter to the 
"Berner Tageblatt" that no Austrian or German prisoners were 
being transported to Siberia, while the Russian press was de- 
scribing the transports and we had letters from our friends, 
Austrian officers, detained there! 



;io4 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

France's answer was: ''She would do as her 
best interests demanded." 

Thereupon Germany declared war on Russia 
in the afternoon of the following day, August i, 
and ordered her mobilisation to begin. 



IV. A DIGRESSION ON THE BRITISH 
BLUE BOOK 

Before we proceed any further in our exposi- 
tion of facts, a short digression is necessary on 
the English official exposition as contained in the 
Blue Book. 

It has been shown how, in the Servian question, 
when all depended on Russia, the English and 
Russian diplomats suddenly without any sustain- 
able reason shifted the responsibility on to Ger- 
many. 

It has been shown that things happened exactly 
as the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg, at 
the beginning of the crisis, had predicted when 
he warned the Russian minister ''that, if Rus- 
sia mobilised, Germany would not be content with 
mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry 

put hers, but would probably declare war at once'' 

105 



io6 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 



(Blue Book No. 17). We may also add, Ger- 
many acted exactly as the German Government 
had announced it would act. For although 
Herr von Jagow had said, on July 25, that he 
*'had given the Russian Government to under- 
stand that the last thing Germany wanted was a 
general war" (Note by Sir H. Rumbold, Blue 
Book No. 18), and the Chancellor declared on 
July 28 : "A war between the Great Powers must 
be avoided" (Note by Sir E. Goschen, Blue Book 
No. 71), still the British Ambassador had been 
forewarned by von Jagow on July 27, that ''if 
Russia mobilised in the north, Germany would 
have to do so too, as she had to be very careful 
not to be taken by surprise" (Note by Sir E. Gos- 
chen, Blue Book No. 43). Again on July 30, the 
urgent warning was sent to the British Govern- 
ment that "beyond the recall of officers on leave 
the Imperial Government had done nothing spe- 
cial in the way of military preparations; some- 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 107 

thing would have soon to be done, for it might 
be too late, and when they mobilised, they would 
have to mobilise on three sides." (Note by Sir E. 
Goschen, Blue Book No. 98.) 

It follows from this that no action could be 
more coherent and sincere than the German Gov- 
ernment's during this crisis. Moreover, it was 
perfectly in accordance with what Sir G. Bu- 
chanan had foretold would be the necessary result 
of Russia's action. As he had informed his Gov- 
ernment of his opinion just as the British dip- 
lomats at Berlin had informed it of the utterances 
quoted above, Sir E. Grey could not be surprised 
by what was done. 

We may add two small but important psycho- 
logical symptoms: Sir E. Goschen relates that, 
on July 29, when prospects darkened, he found 
the German Secretary of State 'Very depressed'' 
(Bl. B. No. 76); Sir G. Buchanan says on the 
next day that the German Ambassador in Peters- 



io8 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

burg, Count Pourtales, ''completely broke down 
on seeing that war was inevitable." 

Why, if the German Government had been de- 
sirous of war, would they have been so unhappy 
when they saw it must inevitably come? They 
ought to have exulted at the success of their 
policy, like M. Iswolskij, who cried out in great 
glee : "This is my war !" 

Remember that the depression of the German 
statesmen was noticed at a time when they still 
thought that England might remain neutral ! 

Yet the author of the Introduction to the Brit- 
ish Blue Book dares conclude with the words: 
'"It is right to say that His Majesty's Government 
believe this (the Czar's declaration that he had 
(done all in his power to avert war) to be a true 
statement of the attitude both of Russia and 
France -throughout this crisis. On the other 
hand, with every wish to be fair and just, it will 
be admitted that the response of Germany and 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 109 

Austria gave no evidence of a sincere desire to 
save the peace of Europe." 

As the facts spoke too clearly for Germany, 
something, and even much, had to be done in the 
way of arrangement to give these words a certain 
semblance of truth. 

To this end it is said (Bl. B., Introd., p. 8, § 6) 
that ''as the result of an offer made by her, Russia 
was able to inform His Majesty's Government 
on the 31st that Austria had at last agreed to do 
the very thing she had refused to do in the first 
days of the crisis, namely, to discuss the whole 
question of her ultimatum to Servia. Russia 
asked the British Government to assume the di- 
rection of these discussions." To make this piece 
of news appear still more impressive, it is fol- 
lowed by the words: "For a few hours there 
seemed to be a hope of peace." Then the para- 
graph ends. There is a space of two lines in 
blank. Then § 7 opens with the "furioso": "At 



no ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

this moment, on Friday, July 31, Germany sud- 
denly despatched an ultimatum to Russia, de- 
manding that she should countermand, etc." 

Now we find here a bold attempt to deceive the 
reader. The facts as they appear from the docu- 
ments of the Blue Book are the following: On 
July 30, the German Secretary of State informed 
the British Ambassador that he had "asked the 
Austro-Hungarian Government whether they 
would be willing to accept mediation on basis of 
occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or 
some other place and issue their conditions from 
here" ^ and that, "if Sir E. Grey could succeed 
in getting Russia to agree to this basis of an ar- 
rangement, and in persuading her in the mean- 
time to take no steps which might be regarded as 
an act of aggression against Austria, he still saw 
some chance that European peace might be pre- 



*King George V had made this Proposition to Prince Henry 
of Prussia in his telegram of July 30. 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 



III 



served." (Note from Sir E. Goschen, Bl. B. No. 
98. ) Sir E. Grey immediately informed the Rus- 
sian Government of this proposal '*as a possible 
relief to the situation/' adding in a note to Sir G. 
Buchanan, that the Russian Ambassador had in- 
deed answered, he feared the condition laid down 
by M. Sazonof on the same day could not be modi- 
fied, but that he, Sir Edward Grey, thought a 
satisfying formula might be found (BI. B. No. 
103). On the next day, July 31, Sir Edward Grey 
informed Sir G. Buchanan that he had learned 
with great satisfaction that, ''as a result of sug- 
gestions by the German Government," discus- 
sions were being resumed between Austria and 
Russia, but that ''as regards military prepara- 
tions, he did not see how Russia could be urged 
to suspend them unless some limit were put by 
Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia." 
(Bl B. No. iia) 
Now, the condition laid down by M. Sazonof 



112 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

on the 30th and slightly altered by him in a way 
suggested by the British Minister on the 31st, 
was but a repetition of Russia's old demand that 
Austria should allow a conference of the Pow- 
ers to decide between her and Servia. But, al- 
though Austria, "as a result of suggestions by 
German Government," declared herself ready to 
reassume direct discussions with Russia, she posi- 
tively refused to stop the march of her troops or 
to submit to an intervention of the Powers, and 
it was that which Russia had asked from her, if 
she was to stop her own preparations (Bl. B. No. 
97 and 113). In the telegram referred to in the 
introduction — it can but be No. 120 of the Blue 
Book, being the only telegram sent from Russia 
on the 31st, in which her magnanimous offer is 
mentioned — not a word is^said of Austria's ac- 
ceptance of it ! 

In the Introduction Austria's readiness for di- 
rect discussion — which discission was declared 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 113 

useless by Russia unless Austria consented to stop 
the march of her troops — is artfully mentioned in 
a way to make the reader believe that she had at 
last accepted the Russian formula which until 
then had always been flatly declined by her. 

There is reprinted in the Blue Book — as No. 
133 — a telegram from Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. 
Goschen which runs thus: 

"Foreign Office, August i, 1914. 

M. de Etter — Counsellor of the Russian Em- 
bassy in London — came to-day to communicate 
the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonof, 
dated July 31, which are as follows: 

"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared 
the readiness of his Government to discuss the 
substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. 
M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfac- 
tion, and said it was desirable that the discus- 
sions should take place in London with the par- 
ticipation of the Great Powers. 

"M. Sazonof hoped that the British Govern- 
ment would assume the direction of these discus- 



,114 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

sions. The whole of Europe would be thankful 
to them. It would be very important that Aus- 
tria should meanwhile put stop provisionally to 
her military action on Servian territory." 

Now if this telegram be the one meant in the 
Introduction, we are forced to state that, ac- 
cording to Sir E. Grey's own words, it was com- 
municated to him only on August i, and could 
therefore give him no hope on July 31, the day 
on which Germany despatched her ultimatum. 

Besides, according to this note, it was not the 
Austrian Ambassador, hut M, Sazonof who de- 
clared it "desirable that the Great Powers should 
participate in the discussions, and that these 
should take place in London." 

Here again Austria is ready for direct discus- 
sion while Russia wanted the conference. And 
it is quite clear that Austria was ready for dis- 
cussion in general but not willing to discuss her 
demands on Servia. In a telegram from Peters- 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 115 

burg of the same day Sir G. Buchanan states 
that the Austrian Ambassador had no "definite 
instructions" from his Government and diverted 
the conversation into a general discussion of the 
relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, 
while the Russian Minister tried to speak on Ser- 
via. 

Lastly we find in the Blue Book reproduced as 
No. 161 a letter addressed to Sir Edward Grey 
by Sir Maurice de Bunsen, former British Am- 
bassador at Vienna, dated from London, Septem- 
ber I. In this letter Sir Maurice declares to have 
been informed by M. Schebeko, Russian Ambas- 
sador at Vienna, on August i, that Count Sza- 
pary, Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 
"had at last conceded the main point at issue by 
announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would 
consent to submit to mediation the points in the 
note to Servia which seemed incompatible with 
the maintenance of Servian independence. M. 



ii6 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

Saz6nof, M. Schebeko added, had accepted this 
proposal on condition that Austria would refrain 
from actual invasion of Servia. Austria in fact 
had finally yielded. . . . " ^ 

This seeming corroboration of the statement 
in the Introduction is perfectly worthless, as the 
condition stipulated by M. Sazonof was not ac- 
cepted. Here again we find that it is the Russian 
Ambassador who informed Sir Maurice de Bun- 
sen of Austria's intentions. Why did the latter 
omit asking the Austrian Government for infor- 
mation concerning so important a point ? Sir M. 
de Bunsen himself adds : "Certainly it was too 
much for Russia to expect that Austria would 
hold back her armies, but this matter could prob- 
ably have been settled by negotiation, and M. 

* The instructions given to the Austrian Ambassador have since 
been published in the Austrian Red Book as No. 49 and 50. The 
reader will find them on pp. 193 and 194 of this study : they con- 
tain just the opposite of what Sir Edward Grey asserts they 
contained. 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR rij 

Schebeko repeatedly told me he was prepared to 
accept any reasonable compromise." This, of 
course, is mere idle talk, especially in such a mo- 
ment and in such a situation, and it is really hard 
to believe that on August i, the day on which war 
had been declared, the Russian Ambassador 
should have had leisure to indulge in such hollow 
generalities, unless — they were spoken because he 
was requested to speak them. In so far as de 
Bunsen's account contains the intimation that 
Austria had been ready to submit to the preten- 
sions of the Russian Government, it is in flat con- 
tradiction to the telegrams of the time. The fact 
has also since been declared untrue and even 
"unthinkable" by the Austrian Foreign Office. I 
am afraid that this piece, made up a month after 
the events, is but a further attempt "to trouble 
what is clear" and to make things appear as if the 
good dispositions of peaceful Russia and yielding 
Austria had been wantonly interrupted by Ger- 



ii8 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

many. It almost seems that the Austrian offer 
was purposely misrepresented by M. Sazonof and 
purposely misunderstood by the English states- 
men/ 

It is not only an untruth that the two eastern 
Powers were well disposed — for neither did Aus- 
tria intend to give way in Servia nor did Russia 
want peace — but further it is untrue that Ger- 
many despatched her ultimatum suddenly on that 
very day, ''out of nervousness'' as is ironically 
suggested in the Introduction.^ The British 
Ambassador had had fair warning on the day be- 
fore that "something would have to be done'* 
unless Russia stopped her warlike preparations, 
and he was again informed on the next day that 
''in a very short time, perhaps to-day, the Ger- 
man Government would take a very serious step." 

^ See the treatment of the same question in the French Yellow 
Book in App. II, pp. 189-203 of this study. 

^As to how the declaration of war actually came about see 
pp. 100-104. 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 119 

(Bl. B. No. 108.) And this step was taken be- 
cause Russian mobilisation continued in a threat- 
ening manner. Russia's mobilisation was a real- 
ity which had to be faced, her formulas were 
words. She would have offered much more pleas- 
ant formulas than the unacceptable one discussed 
above and M. Schebeko would have added as 
many kind and hopeful words as one might wish, 
on condition that Russia would be allowed to as- 
semble her immense armies undisturbed by Ger- 
many. But Germany could not leave her border 
undefended for a formula's sake. 

In the Introduction as well as in Sir Maurice 
de Bunsen's letter a vain attempt is made to turn 
.things upside down, and the method is almost as 
unfortunate as that adopted by the "Times," 
which wrote on July 29, "Germany has behaved 
very well, but she is being dragged at the heels 
of the Austrian war-chariot," and on October 27, 
upon better thoughts: "The wretched Dual 



I20 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

Monarchy is being dragged at the heels of the 
Prussian war-chariot V 

We are sorry to say that we have to adduce 
still more unpleasant proofs of "arrangement" 
in the British official publication. 

War with Russia meant most likely war with 
France. For this Germany and Austria were 
prepared, although they asked France, as a mat- 
ter of course, whether she would remain neutral. 

In order, however, to prove Germany's alleged 
aggressiveness even on the French side, strange 
documents are brought forth. 

With a telegram from Sir Edward Grey to the 
British Ambassador in Paris, Sir F. Bertie, of 
July 30 (Bl. B. No. 105), there are printed three 
enclosures : No. i and 2, the two letters of No- 
vember, 191 2, which contained the famous 
''agreement" on military co-operation between 
France and England; the third a note from the 
French Minister for Foreign Affairs to the 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 121 

French Ambassador at London, M. Paul Cambon, 
in which the Minister complains of German offen- 
sive acts on the French frontier. The French 
Minister's telegram bears the date *Taris, July 
31/' How could it be sent enclosed in a despatch 
from London of the 30th ? 

But what is still more astonishing, the text of 
the French note begins with the words : "Uarmee 
allemande a ses avant pastes sur nos homes fron- 
tieres; Vendredi, hier, par deux fois des patrou- 
illes allemandes out penetre sur notre territoire" 
"The German army has its advanced posts on our 
frontier posts ; Friday, yesterday, German patrols 
twice penetrated on to our territory." 

Notice, please : Friday, Vendredi, was July 31. 

According to this, the telegram was sent on 
August I ! and the date must have been changed 
— most awkwardly changed — into July 31 ! 

In the second edition of the Blue Book, the 
contradiction having probably been noticed, the 



122 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

date of the telegram is simply left out, hut not a 
word is offered in explanation of so strange a 
fact! 

The text, too, is altered in the second edition, 
the word "Vendredi — Friday" being left out in 
the French text as well as in the English version 
of it! 

What are we to infer from all this? 

But there is more. In the French note it is said 
further: 'Tajoute que toutes nos informations 
concordent pour montrer que les preparatifs alle- 
mands ont commence samedi, le jour meme de la 
remise de la note autrichienne/' "1 would add 
that all my information goes to show that the 
German preparations began on Saturday, the very 
day on which the Austrian note was handed in." 

Now the Austrian note was not handed in on 
Saturday the 25th, but on Thursday 2^, while 
the Servian reply was given on Saturday 25. 

There again, in the second edition of the Blue 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 123 

Book, the actual dates of the Austrian ultimatum 
and the Servian reply are given in a footnote, and 
It is added that the latter document is the one 
being referred to in the text. 

The whole passage is an awkward and blun- 
dering invention to make the reader believe that 
Germany had concocted the Ultimatum to Servia 
together with Austria as a means to have war, 
and had begun preparation at once. 

What are we to conclude? Shall we believe 
that the "nervous Frenchman'' who wrote out the 
despatch made so many blunders in one note? 
The fact remains that two different texts being 
given in the two editions of the Blue Book, the 
documents have most certainly been altered. And 
this fact is scarcely of a nature to enhance con- 
fidence in the British official publication.^ 

What a change has taken place in British diplo- 
macy since the days of Disraeli and Gladstone ! 

^ See further particulars on the altered note In Append. II, 
"The French Yellow Book," on pp. 203-207 of this study. 



V. THE CRISIS. 

ENGLAND AND THE BELGIAN 
QUESTION 

On August I war between Germany and Rus- 
sia was declared. War between Austria and Rus- 
sia on the one hand, between France and Ger- 
many on the other hand, seemed inevitable. 

On this same day, August i, the German Chan- 
cellor received a telegram from the German Am- 
bassador in London, Prince Lichnowsky, in which 
the latter informed him of the fact that Sir E.. 
Grey had just asked by telephone — Sir Edward 
Grey was careful not to put it down in writing — 
whether, if France remained neutral, Germany 
would refrain from attacking her. Hereupon 
the Emperor himself telegraphed at once to the 

King of England : 

124 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 125 

"If France offers her neutrality, which should 
be guaranteed by the British army and navy, I 
shall of course desist from an attack on France 
and shall dispose of my troops in a different way. 
I hope France will not become nervous. I am 
herewith giving the order by telephone and by 
telegraph that the troops at my frontier be kept 
from crossing the border. Wilhelm.'' It is natu- 
ral that the German Government should have 
asked this guaranty from England, as the offer 
came from England. 

Without further delay, a telegraphic answer 
came from the King of Great Britain in which 
the whole was declared to be a "misunderstand- 
ing." Now, misunderstanding or not, the inci- 
dent gives final conclusive proof that Germany 
w^as far from wishing war with France, and far 
from having aggressive intentions. 

Whatever may have been the nature of the 
"misunderstanding," it was, of course, extremely 
improbable, considering the nature of the Franco- 
Russian Alliance, that France would or even 



126 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

could remain neutral, — France who so long had 
nourished the desire of revenge and who for 
years had been paying Russia for future services 
in that direction. M. Cambon had stated this 
very clearly on July 29 (Blue Book No. 87). 

During the crisis the English Government had 
been repeatedly urged by Russia and France to 
announce that it would stand by them in any 
emergency — "then there would be no war/' As 
late as July 30, the President of the French Re- 
public expressed his conviction that "peace be- 
tween the Powers was in the hands of Great 
Britain. If his Majesty's Government announced 
that England would come to the aid of France in 
the event of a conflict between France and Ger- 
many as a result of the present difference between 
Austria and Servia, there would be no war, for 
Germany would at once modify her attitude." 
(Notes from Sir George Buchanan to Sir Ed- 
ward Grey of July 25 and 2J, from Sir Edward 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 127 

Grey to Sir G. Buchanan of July 2J, and from 
Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey of July 30, 
Blue Book No. 17, 44, 47, 99; Note from M. 
Jules Cambon to M. Bienvenu-Martin of July 25, 
Yellow Book No. 47.^ 

The mere thought that Germany or Austria 
could be intimidated into submission goes but to 
show how little real understanding Russia and 
France had of their two near neighbours. 

English statesmen knew better, and the answer 
which they gave to their friends was a warning 
that ''the German Government's attitude would 
only be stiffened by such a menace while their 
own part as mediators would be rendered more 
difficult.'' At the same time they gave them to" 
understand that "England, if her counsels of 

^M. Cambon, being, as a Frenchman, particularly imaginative, 
even goes so far as to believe that fear of England's joining in 
the war contributed to make Germany postpone her mobilisation 
which, as he strongly suspects, had already been decided on in 
Potsdam on July 29. (Note of July 30, Yellow Book No. 105.) 



128 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

moderation were disregarded, m ght be converted 
into an ally," and further that "the impression 
that England would stand aside in case of war, 
ought to be dispelled by the orders given to the 
First Fleet which is concentrated, as it happens, 
at Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave." 
(Bl. B. No. 17, 44, and 47.) 

The explanation of this attitude of the British 
Government has been given in Chapter II on pp. 

33-34. 

''Agreements" for future military and naval 
co-operation had been made or prepared not only 
with France and Russia but even — this was still 
a secret — with neutral Belgium as well. Al- 
though at the time when the Anglo-French agree- 
ment had been concluded. Sir Edward Grey, in 
his letter to M. Cambon, expressly stated that the 
''disposition of the French and British fleets re- 
spectively at the present moment — that is to say 
November 191 2 — was not based upon an en- 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 129 

gagement to co-operate in war'* things were very 
different now. In fact not only the First Fleet 
''happened to be concentrated at Portland/' but 
almost the whole English Fleet happened to be 
concentrated in the North Sea, and the whole 
French Fleet in the Mediterranean. Though the 
British statesmen did not, perhaps, find the pres- 
ent moment as favourable for a general war as a 
later moment might have been, they were per- 
fectly decided not to stand aside, but to join with 
France and Russia and as many of their allies as 
could be found, in order to profit by the occasion 
and crush Germany. The only question was to 
find a reason sufficient to inveigle English public 
opinion. On the whole their policy was but the 
continuation of the old English policy of fighting 
down the strongest continental state with the help 
of continental allies. They knew that they could 
count on a party who thought like them, ''Ger- 
maniam esse delendam/' Among themselves they 



ii30 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

took no care to hide their thoughts, and whoever 
knows how to read between the lines of smooth 
and cautious diplomatic language will understand 
what It meant when Sir G. Buchanan on July 
i24 said in St Petersburg: "Direct British in- 
terests in Servia are nil, and a war on behalf of 
that country would never be sanctioned by BritisK 
public opinion" ; or again when Sir Edward Grey 
said to the Russian Ambassador in London, on 
July 2y, that the ''impression that England would 
at any event stand aside ought to be dispelled by 
the orders given to the first fleet" though he 
added, of course, that ''his reference to it must 
not be taken to mean that anything more than 
diplomatic action was promised." No more could 
be "promised," but much more could be done, and 
very much could be implied. The acting French 
Minister of Foreign Affairs understood this per- 
fectly, when he expressed himself "grateful for 
'the communication of this promise and quite 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 131^ 

appreciated the impossibility for His Majesty's 
Government to declare themselves solidaires witH 
Russia on a question between Austria and Servia, 
which in its present condition is noi one affecting 
England/' (BL B. No. 6, 47, 62.) This was on 
the 28th. On the 29tE M. Paul Cambon, when 
Sir E. Grey had explained his attitude to him, 
likewise gave answer that *'he understood it to 
be a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supre- 
macy between Teuton and Slav we should noi 
feel called to intervene; should other issues be 
raised, and Germany and France become in- 
volved, so that the question became one of the 
hegemony of Europe, we should then decide whaf 
was necessary for us to do." M. Cambon, as Sir 
Edward Grey added, "seemed quite prepared for; 
thi3 announcement and made no criticism on it/* 
He fook, however, care to state that ^'France was 
bound fo help Russia if Russia was attacked/* 
(Sir E. Grey to Sii: E Bertie. BI. B. No. 87.)' 



132 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

On July 31, Sir Edward Grey took pains to 
reassure the French Government, through his 
Ambassador, by saying "Nobody here feels that 
in this dispute, as far as it has yet gone, British 
treaties or obligations are involved" . . . and 
adding in the same breath: ''German govern- 
ment do not expect our neutrality/' ^"We can- 
not undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a 
Avar/' said he, and when the French Ambassador 
urged His Majesty's Government to recon- 
sider this decision, he explained his words 
by the important comment: -We should 
not be justified in giving any pledge to intervene 
at the present moment, but we will certainly con- 
sider the situation directly there is a new develop- 
ment." Again, on the same day, he gives vent 
to the still more expressive sentence: "Further: 
developments might alter this situation and cause 
the Government and Parliament to take the view, 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 133 

that intervention is justified." (Bl. B. No. 116, 
119.) 

The words "in the present condition," "as far. 
as the dispute has yet gone," "at the present mo- 
ment," "further developments might alter the 
situation," and the like return in every message, 
and they v^ere essential. Nor were they misun- 
derstood. They covered the Foreign Secretary 
perfectly, and at the same time gave to the hearer 
very solid hopes. Sir Edward Grey possessed the 
consummate art of saying very much while he 
did not seem to say anything. His "dance be- 
tween two rows of eggs" was in a way a splen- 
did performance. 

No promise was given, no agreement bound the 
English nation, yet her allies knew they could 
count on her. Peace had been mediated on 
every side with the most honest face and the best 
words in the world, yet war was being prepared 
in the most fearful and inevitable way. Truth 



134 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

had been spoken to everybody, and yet he was 
deceiving his own country and the world at 
large. Even to Germany he had given so polite 
and friendly warning at the right moment that 
she could not complain or at least ought not to 
do so (see Blue Book No. 85 and 89). 

The fact is, Sir Edward Grey waited for tKe 
*'new development," perfectly sure to find it. He 
had it ready in his pocket for full two years and 
sprang it on the 31st, — not on his Parliament, but 
on Germany. 

He asked the French and the German Govern- 
ment in two telegrams of identical tenor whether 
''they would engage to respect the neutrality of 
Belgium so long as no other Power violated it." 

The telegram to France was naturally sent 
only for appearance's sake, as the two allies were 
working in perfect harmony. 

Germany declined to give an immediate an- 
swer, because by doing so she would have be- 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 135 

trayed her military plans — but desired to know 
first, through her Ambassador in England, Prince 
Lichnowsky, whether, if Germany gave a prom- 
ise not to violate Belgian neutrality, England 
would engage to remain neutral. Sir E. Grey 
replied that he could not say that, he did not think 
that he could give a promise of neutrality on that 
condition alone. 

Two days before, the German Chancellor, in 
exchange for British neutrality, had offered the 
pledge of the Government not to take any French 
territory in Europe in case of victory. Sir Ed- 
ward Grey had answered indignantly — but why 
indignantly— it would be "a disgrace for Eng- 
land to make this bargain with Germany at the 
expense of France, a disgrace from which the 
good name of this country would never recover." 
It was offered, moreover, that the German fleet 
would abstain from attacking the French coast 
in the channel; but this was considered as being 



136 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

equally insufficient. Why was this a bargain at 
the expense of France? 

So Prince Lichnowsky "pressed" the Foreign 
Secretary to formulate his conditions himself. 
He even suggested that the integrity of France 
and her colonies might be guaranteed. 

Sir E. Grey, hard pressed, answered that he 
felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to 
remain neutral on such terms ; he could only say : 
"We must keep our hands free." (Bl. B. No. 
123.)' 

Now on what terms would Sir E. Grey have 
engaged to remain neutral ? 

^ No. 123. — Sir Edward Grey to Sir R Goschen, British Am- 
bassador at Berlin. 

Foreign Office, August i, 1914- 

Sir: I TOLD the German Ambassador today that the reply 
of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Bel- 
gium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality 
of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could 
see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been 
given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety 
and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation 
of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 137 

There is as far as England is concerned, per- 
haps no more important document in the whole 
Blue Book than this telegram No. 123, and the 
evidence it contains is rendered still more pre- 
cious by its being written — not telephoned as 
in the case of his offer of French neutrality^— ^ 
by Sir Edward Grey, so that he cannot even say 

respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public 
feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this 
question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorized to tell 
him this I gave him a memorandum of it. 

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to vio- 
late Belgium neutrality we would engage to remain neutral. 

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, 
and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I 
could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by 
public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would 
appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think 
that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition 
alone. 

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formu- 
late conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even 
suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be 
guaranteed. 

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to 
remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we 
must keep our hands free. I am, &c., 

E. GREY. 

^ See page 124. 



138 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

that he was misunderstood. His resolution not to 
remain neutral on any account had long since 
been taken, but the ''moral drapery/' the theatri- 
cal pretext for onlookers were still missing. 
Further proof of his resolution not to remain 
neutral is to be found in the letter, dated July 
30, of the Belgian Charge d'Affaires at St. 
Petersburg, M. de FEscaille (already quoted 
in Part III on p. 81), in which is stated "the Rus- 
sian Government have the promise that England 
will assist France." 

Sir Edward Grey's seemingly superfluous ques- 
tion as to whether France and Germany were 
ready to engage to respect Belgium's neutrality 
was necessary for the purpose of imposing on 
English and foreign public opinion. As he 
himself said to Prince Lichnowsky: "Our 
attitude would be determined largely by public 
opinion here, and the neutrality of Belgium would 
appeal very strongly to public opinion here." He 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 139 

would have been in great perplexity if Germany 
against all expectation had engaged to respect 
it. He knew, however, that this was impossible, 
and that he could be quite sure of the game he 
was playing. 

In order to understand this question of the 
neutrality of Belgium, it is necessary to consider 
the military and the political situation, respec- 
tively, of Germany and Belgium. And in order 
to be fair, we shall take an Englishman's view 
of it, the view of Mr. Hilaire Belloc, the well- 
known military writer, who in the "'London 
Magazine" of May, 1912, published a most in- 
teresting article, entitled ''In Case of War.'' In 
this article he states, as we stated before on p. 20, 
that the situation of Germany's western frontier 
is favorable only to France, the Vosges Moun- 
tains being a natural bulwark ; while behind them 
the formidable line of fortresses from Verdun to 
Bel fort is such that the German offensive must 



I40 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

either break to pieces before it or at the very 
most only be able to force it with terrible losses 
of men and fatal loss of time. The present war 
has well proved the truth of this assertion. While 
Germany lies almost open to French inroads, 
there is small chance for a German attack on 
France. Not so well protected by far is the 
French frontier towards Belgium. There are no 
foru c^ses of great worth on this line. Here and 
here alone would France be open to a German in- 
vasion. But neutral Belgium lies between the 
two countries, and, what is still more important, 
neutral Belgium is excellently fortified on the 
German side. Mr. Belloc says literally (on p. 
283) : ''The French strategic frontier does not 
correspond to their political frontier on the 
North" and again on p. 286: "The real strategic 
frontier of France is the Meuse river." 

Given this situation, Germany would, of course 
be compelled to attack France through Belgium. 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 141 

^'Xet us take it as our starting point," says Mr. 
Belloc on pp. 284-5, *'that the Germans would and 
must try to get across the Meuse at Liege." 

It may seem unimportant that Mr. Belloc says 
further that it would be "a woeful miscalculation" 
to consider the capture and occupation of a fort- 
ress like Liege as ''the matter of a few hours or 
even of a few days," ^'calculations based upon 
rushing its defence are calculations of defeat." 
We pardon Mr. Belloc for not knowing German 
valour and German energy. Unimportant like- 
wise may seem the measures which, according 
to Mr. Belloc, are incumbent on England to as- 
sist Belgium against Germany, and also his 
theory that "Antwerp, so long as Germany does 
not control the sea, can be made the secure base 
of an ever increasing force." All of this is un- 
important. What is of real significance to us is 
that the English military authority himself states 
that Germany had no choice but to go at France 



142 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

through Belgium. He adds, of course, in pass- 
ing, that this would not have to be feared "if trea- 
ties were held sacred by the Government of Ber- 
lin'' and that it "would be an abominably wrong 
and treacherous action"; but this is just a slight 
bow to that hypocrisy which is common in poli- 
tics, the main import of which can be expressed 
in the sentence: "I may do wrong for my coun- 
try, but you may not for yours." The sacredness 
of the treaty does not interest him so very much, 
after all, as he devotes only two lines to the moral, 
and many pages to the military side of the ques- 
tion. 

Germany had indeed no choice. On one side 
she had immense Russia threatening an open bor- 
derline ; on the other side France, who, whil^ be- 
ing protected from an attack, could easily carry 
the war into the German provinces. Germany 
was certainly lost if she hesitated to take the way 
which the English author had told her two years 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 143 



before she must try. How would the general or 
the statesman be treated in England who re- 
ported : ''I am sorry to say, Great Britain is lost; 
it is true, I might have saved her by marching 
across neutral territory, but I have always been 
told that I was not to do that, and my country- 
men, who are exceedingly severe and even inexor- 
able on the point of morals, would never have par- 
doned me for saving them in that way." Sir Ed- 
ward Grey, I have no doubt, would have clapped 
him on his back as being the man of his ethics, 
and he would have been carried in triumph 
through the London streets. The world seems to 
have lost sight of the fact that not all of Britain's 
great men, not even all of her Parliament, be- 
lieved that Germany's proposal to march through 
Belgium was Sir Edward Grey's real reason for 
entering the war. Meetings of protest were held 
by leading men. Lord Morley, Burns and Treve- 
lyan resigned from office. Mr. Ramsay Mac- 



144 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

donald, M. P., answered Sir Edward Grey's 
speech of August 3 in the following words : "I 
think the Government which the right honourable 
gentleman represents and for which he speaks is 
wrong. I think the verdict of history will be that 
they are wrong. ... If the right honourable 
gentleman could come to us and tell us that a 
small European nationality like Belgium is in 
danger, and could assure us he is going to con- 
fine the conflict to that question, then we would 
support him. What is the use of talking 
about coming to the aid of Belgium when, 
as a matter of fact, you are engaging in a whole 
European war which is not going to leave the 
map of Europe in the position it is in now ? The 
right honourable gentleman said nothing about 
Russia. We will want to know about that. We 
want to try to find out what is going to happen 
when it is all over to the power of Russia in 
Europe and we are not going blindly into this 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 145 

conflict without having some sort of a rough idea: 
as to what is going to happen." 

Another member of Parliament, Mr. Pon- 
sonby, in the thirteen questions published by him 
in the "Nation" answered to Qu. 4: "Would we 
have declared war on France, if in the interest of 
her security, she would have found it necessary to 
send a French army across the Belgian frontier ?'* 
"Nor 

But another still more important answer was 
given in a most unexpected way. In the war-office 
in Brussels most interesting papers were found, 
among them a report of General Ducarme, dated 
Brussels, April 10, 1906, and addressed to the 
Belgian War-Minister, relating to a conversation 
he had had with the English Military Attache 
Lt.-Col. Barnardiston. The subject of the con- 
versation had been the landing of British troops 
in Belgium in case of a German attack on the 
country. In this conversation and consequent upon 



146 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

it in the report, everything is considered: what 
forces would be landed — 100,000 men — and of 
what troops they would consist ; the landing-place, 
which ought to be Dunkirk, because Antwerp 
would take much more time; the railway-trans- 
port from there, and the time required for the 
transport. It was further suggested that maps 
should be prepared for the English officers, and 
pictures representing the Belgian uniforms, as 
well as translations of certain Belgian military 
instructions ; also Belgian staff-officers should be 
appointed to accompany the single British corps, 
etc. There is a note to the report, in which is 
added that the English General Grierson had in- 
formed General Ducarme, at the manoeuvres, 
that even 150,000 men could be landed. Of 
course, the well-known formula is not missing 
"that the English Government should not be 
bound by the agreement," and on the margin is 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 147 

written : ^'U entree des Anglais en Belgique ne se 
ferait qu'apres la violation de notre neutralite 
par rAllemagne" ("the English would not enter 
Belgium before the violation of our neutrality 
through Germany"). 

A few years later, however, a new conference 
having taken place between the English Military 
Attache and the Belgian General Jungbluth, a 
new report was written. The paper is dated April 
23 only, no year being given, but it is to be in- 
[f erred from the contents that it must be 191 1 or 
1 9 12 — . The report was made by Count Van der 
Straaten of the Belgian Foreign Office. Accord- 
ing to this document, England, "during the late 
events," as Col. Bridges informed General Jung- 
bluth, would have sent over 160,000 men, and on 
the Belgian General's protest that Belgian 
consent would first be necessary for that, the 
Englishman replied that he was aware of this, 
but that, knowing Belgium to be incapable of re- 



148 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

pelling the German attack, England would have 
landed her army in any case/ 

It must also be added that in the pockets of 
English officers, killed or taken prisoners during 
the present war, not only detailed maps of Bel- 
gium have been found, but elaborate military 
informations concerning Belgium in English 
translation, such as could only be furnished by 
the Belgian General Staff and which required a 
long time to be prepared. On each copy the 
words "Property of the Crown'' were printed, 
with severe injunctions of secrecy to the respon- 
sible possessor of the same. 

Moreover, important papers were found in the 
possession of the Secretary of the English Em- 
bassy at Brussels, Mr. Grant Watson, who had 

* Compare the words of the German ultimatum : "The Imperial 
Government are afraid that Belgium in spite of the best inten- 
tions will be unable to repel a march of French forces. . . . 
Germany is forced by measures of her enemies to violate Belgian 
territory, . . ." (Belg. Gray Book No. 20.) 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 149 

remained there and was arrested by the German 
troops. Among them were secret informations 
concerning Belgian mobilisation, the defence of 
Antwerp and its provisions, dated May 27, 191 3; 
also a piece of paper on which was written by 
hand: 

''Renseignements: 

1. Les officiers frangais ont regu ordre de re- 
joindre des le 2y apres-midi: 

2. Le meme jour, le chef de Gare de Peignies a 
regu ordre de concentrer vers Maiibeuge tons 
les wagons fermes disponihles, en vice de 
transports de troupes. 

Communique par la Brigade de gendarmerie de 
Frameries." ^ 

Now, Feignies is a railway station in France 
3 km. from the Belgian frontier, while Frameries 
is a station of the same line in Belgium, about 10 
km. from the borderline. This meant active as- 

*A11 these documents have been reproduced by order of the 
German Government, and the facsimiles have been communi- 
cated to the Governments of neutral states. 



I50 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

sistance given to the French MobiHsation on July 
27, 1914 — that is to say, six days before the de- 
livery of the German ultimatum. The papers 
were confiscated just as Mr. Grant Watson tried 
to destroy them. 

There we find the neutral State of Belgium 
granting to one neighbour the permission to 
march through its territory, furnishing maps and 
transcriptions of its most jealously guarded mili- 
tary secrets to one side and to one side only, the 
Allies.^ 

Let us suppose things had taken the other 

^Belgium had not been without timely warning. Her own 
Ambassador at the court of Berlin, Baron Greindl, had admon- 
ished the Belgian Government to beware of making one-sided 
agreements with the Triple-Entente. He even went to the 
length of calling the English propositions "naive and perfidious." 
Yet, in full consciousness of all these facts, the Belgian Foreign 
Minister, M. Davignon, dared declare in a note addressed to the 
German Ambassador, Herr von Below-Saleske, on Aug. 3, 1914 
(Belgian Gray Book No. 22) : "Belgium has always been faith- 
ful to her international obligations; she has fulfilled her duties 
in a spirit of loyal impartiality," and he repeated these words in 
a note addressed to the heads of Belgian Embassies in all foreign 
countries on Aug. 5. (Belgian Gray Book, No. 44.) 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR i^i 

course, let us suppose for a moment that the Bel- 
gian Government had made the same agreements 
with Germany, fearing France and her inten- 
tions. It may be well to remind the reader of 
the fact that Belgium had been afraid of French 
Politics for many years and of more than a mere 
march of troops through Belgian territory. (In 
1867 France desired to incorporate Belgium in 
France and proposed to Prussia that she should 
take Holland.) Let us suppose that this state of 
things had lasted and that the agreements had 
been made with Germany: will anybody believe 
that England and France would have been sat- 
isfied, that they would have declared in Brus- 
sels: "Provided that you take care to add that 
all your arrangements with Germany are made 
for the protection of your neutrality and for the 
prevention of violations of it, they are all right, 
your 'conversations' with the German military 
attache may be ever so explicit, they may touch 



152 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

every detail of the future inroad of German 
troops; your attitude is correct and not in con- 
tradiction with your international obligations." 
Does anybody believe that this would have been 
the attitude of the French and English Govern- 
ments ? Let us suppose further that the Belgian 
Government had been compelled by the German 
Government to make military preparations on the 
French border, what would French and English' 
statesmen have said? 

All this was done — ^but the other way round! 
The arrangements were made with England, the 
preparations were against Germany. The proof 
is to be found in an article which was written 
by a well-known member of the Belgian Parlia- 
ment, M. Louis de Brouckere and published by 
him in the ''Neue Zeit'' of July, 1914, No. 18, 
just a few days before the war broke out: 

''Only a few days after the elections (of 1912) 
the (Belgian) Government obeyed the urgent 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 153 

admonitions of France, England and, undoubt- 
edly, Russia, and M. de Brocqueville brought a 
bill before the Chamber introducing Compulsory 
Service. . . . Our field force has been increased 
to 150,000 men by order of the Triple-Entente 
which has installed itself as protector of our 
possessions. . . . To-morrow perhaps England, 
.who considers Compulsory Service to be an oner- 
ous institution only within her own borders, will 
again ask us to fulfill our obligations. . . . We 
must dance to the pipe of France and England, 
dance even to our death.'* 

Prophetic words, destined to be realised only 
too soon! Nobody could express in clearer 
terms on which side and on whose behalf the 
Belgian Government was making its military 
preparations. Now consider all elements to- 
gether: Belgium, by her very situation, forms 
the strategic frontier of England and France, 
her fortresses were considered England's and 



154 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

France's defences ; they played an important part 
in their strategic plans; her government had 
made arrangements with both in order to make 
her position still more effective in their favour 
and against Germany, while no arrangements had 
been made with Germany against a possible 
French or English inroad; at the wish of the 
Triple-Entente, Belgium had increased her field 
force and fortified her defences against Germany; 
the sympathies of the public and of the press 
were all for France: what more, please, could 
have been done against the spirit and the let- 
ter of Belgian neutrality? 

Germany did not desire to take Belgian ter- 
ritory nor to touch Belgium's independence; 
twice she offered peace and perfect restoration 
for damages after the war. She only wanted 
to march through Belgium.^ 

In the face of these facts, hear Mr. Asquith 

^ See the German ultimatum in Appendix I. 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 155 

declaiming in Parliament on August 6, 19 14. 
"What does that — the German proposal — 
amount to? Let me just ask the house. I do 
so, not with the object of inflaming passions, 
certainly not with the object of exciting feel- 
ings against Germany ["O masters, if I were 
disposed to stir — your hearts and minds to mu- 
tiny and rage, — I should do Brutus wrong''], but 
I do so to vindicate and make clear the position 
of the British Government in this matter. What 
did that proposal amount to? In the first place 
it meant this: That behind the back of France 
— they were not made a party to these communi- 
cations — we should have given, if we had as- 
sented to that, a free license to Germany to an- 
nex, in the event of a successful war, the whole 
of the extra-European dominions and possessions 
of France. What did it mean as regards Bel- 
gium? When she addressed, as she has ad- 
dressed in these last few days, her moving appeal 



156 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

to us to fulfil our solemn guarantee of her neu- 
trality, what reply should we have given? What 
reply should we have given to that Belgian ap- 
peal? We should have been obliged to say that, 
without her knowledge, we had bartered away 
to the Power threatening her our obligation to 
keep our plighted word. The House has read, 
and the country has read, of course, in the last 
few hours, the most pathetic appeal addressed 
by the King of Belgium, and I do not envy the 
man who can read that appeal with an unmoved 
heart. Belgians are fighting and losing their 
lives. What would have been the position of 
Great Britain to-day in the face of that spec- 
tacle, if we had assented to this infamous pro- 
posal? Yes, and what are we to get in return? 
A promise — nothing more ; a promise as to what 
Germany would do in certain eventualities; a 
promise, be it observed — I am sorry to have to 
say it, but it must be put upon record — given 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 157 

by a Power which was at that very moment an- 
nouncing its intention to violate its own treaty, 
and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, 
if we had dallied or temporised, we, as a Govern- 
ment, should have covered ourselves with dis- 
honour, and we should have betrayed the in- 
terests of this country, of which we are trus- 
tees." 

Must not these words have sounded fine and 
pathetic in the ears of the hearers who were 
ignorant of the monstrous comedy that preceded 
and which culminated in the two telegrams of 
July 31? 

It is only in Mr. Asquith^s last sentence, where 
he says that the country's honour as well as its 
interest required the war, and only in the lat- 
ter half of this last sentence that a ray of truth 
breaks through his statements. 

In this firm of "Honour and Interest" which, 
according to Mr. Asquith, determined the Eng- 



158 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

lish Cabinet's action, Honour is a very insig- 
nificant person with a fine appearance, who is 
sent forth to represent the house whenever his 
partner thinks fit to do so, but who is at once 
silenced and shut up in a back-room when his 
views do not happen to be in accordance with 
those of the shrewd business-man who is the 
real head of the house, and who reserves the 
management of it absolutely to himself. 

Politicians, of course, are often forced to hide 
their thoughts, but seldom does one find a great 
statesman resorting to such "cant" as Mr. As- 
quith has done. 

England's honour implicated by the observa- 
tion of neutrality or the violation of treaties she 
has put her name to! In how many treaties, 
since 1878, has Great Britain pledged her faith 
as a guarantee of the integrity of Turkish ter- 
ritory? Yet, in spite of so many solemn prom- 
ises, she did not feel herself bound to keep ''her 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 159 

plighted word'' in 1912, but delivered the Otto- 
man Empire, a friendly Power, up to the Balkan 
League. Nor did Mr. Asquith's Cabinet then 
abhor the bartering away of their obligations 
behind a friendly Power's back. 

In 1807, in time of peace, the British bom- 
barded the neutral Port of Copenhagen and took 
possession of the entire Danish fleet. 

But in 1914 Mr. Asquith continued: "If I 
am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in 
two sentences. In the first place, to fulfil a sol- 
emn international obligation, an obligation which, 
if it had been entered in between private per- 
sons in the ordinary concerns of life, would have 
been regarded as an obligation not only of law 
but of honour which no self-respecting man could 
possibly have repudiated. I say, secondly, we 
are fighting to vindicate the principle which, 
in these days when force, material force, some- 
times seems to be the dominant influence and f ac- 



i6o ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

tor in the development of mankind, we are fight- 
ing to vindicate the principle that small nationali- 
ties are not to be crushed, in defiance of inter- 
national good faith, by the arbitrary will of a 
strong and overmastering Power." Thus speaks 
the Prime- ^Minister of the British Empire, which 
is strong, overmastering numberless small na- 
tions powerless to resist her! Did he never for 
a moment think of Eg}^pt, of the Boer Republics 
in 1904, of Southern Persia, of Xorth Persia 
delivered up to Russia and trodden down by 
her with greatest brutality ? Were they not small 
nations crushed by the arbitrary will of a strong 
and overmastering Power? Why if so desirous 
'*to vindicate the principle,'' did the English Gov- 
ernment never fight for oppressed countries like 
Finland or Poland, the Baltic provinces, the Ru- 
thenians ? 

All the world know^s w^hy England made war 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR i6i 

on Germany and 'Svhat she is fighting for." 
To begin with, England beHeved tliat she was 
taking no risk. To quote from Sir Edward 
Grey's speech of August 3 (Blue Book, Part II 
[i] ) — we hope that speech may ever be remem- 
bered — "For us, with a powerful Fleet, which 
we believe able to protect our commerce and to 
protect our shores, and to protect our interests if 
WQ are engaged in war, we shall suiter but lit- 
tle more than we shall suiter if we stand aside." 

England's great fear was the growth of Ger- 
man commerce. In the time between 1901 and 
191 1 German commerce had grown from 7.3 to 
17.6 milliards of Marks, that is to say, increased 
by 10 milliards or by 141^0. 

English Commerce in the same period had 
grown from 12.7 to 21. i milliards, that is to say, 
increased by 8.4 milliards or by. 66%. 

It is clear that in a given period German Com- 



i62 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

merce, if allowed to grow unimpaired, will noi 
only proportionately but also absolutely become 
superior to British Commerce. 

From 1897 to 191 1 the German merchant ma- 
rine increased from 3,256,000 to 7,884,000 reg. 
tons, that is to say, by 192%; the English mer- 
chant marine in the same time increased from 
22,507,000 to 33,864,000 reg. tons, that is to say, 

by 59%. 

From 1897 to 191 1 the percentage of the 
world's ships, which is represented by the Ger- 
man merchant marine, rose from 6.5 to 9.9, that 
is to say, 3%, while the percentage represented 
by the English merchant marine decreased from 
54.3 to 47.4, that is yfo. 

These and a series of similar figures contain 
the true reason of England's war against Ger- 
many. Regarding this point, however, Mr. As- 
quith said nothing. The fact has since been con- 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 163 

fessed with all commendable openness by British 
statesmen as well as by the British press/ 

Now it seems permissible to combat, nay to 
ruin, a commercial competitor by commercial 
means, but not by burning his house or by an 
attempt on his life; and it seems particularly 
contemptible to make this attempt on his life 
by "striking him from behind while he is fight- 
ing for his life against two assailants/' This 
is what England has done, and it is what in Ger- 
many has caused the sudden and terrible hatred 
of the English, of Sir Edward Grey, of Asquith. 
The high esteem that up to the war existed for 
England exists now only for those few great 
British minds which have kept their impartial 
yiew of the entangled matters of this world. 

' In a long article on Iron and Steel Industry in Germany and 
England in the "Engineer" (Aug. 28 to Sept. 25) it is said: 
•"The end of the war must be the methodical ruin of all great 
industrial establishments in the German provinces occupied by 
the allied troops." 



i64 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

While the Germans fight for their country, for 
their homes, for their existence, England, threat- 
ened by no one in her existence, made war for 
her mercantile interests, for her money's sake. 
The Germans knew against what odds and for 
what a price they were to contend, while for Eng- 
land it has been a question of the merest expe- 
diency. 

There is still another reason for our disap- 
pointment. The Germans admired England. 
Ever since the first half of the nineteenth cen- 
tury they believed her to be the birthplace as well 
as the patron of political liberty. Some of them, 
deceived by outward show, and some, by the ex- 
istence of many Englishmen whose views are 
most enlightened, whose moral standard is very 
high, deceived by these things, I say, some of 
them believed in a higher English civilisation. 
And man hates to be deceived in what he thought 
an ideal, and more than an enemy he hates thd 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR i6^ 

iriend who has betrayed his belief in him. Evi- 
dence of the very friendly attitude of the Ger- 
man people towards England and the English 
we find in the utterance of no less a witness, 
than Lord Aspley, who returned to London on 
August 2 after a two months' sojourn in the 
German Empire. The "Morning Post'' of Aug- 
ust 4 relates the following: *'Asked as to the 
attitude of the German people towards England 
and the English, he said that his experience had 
been that they were friendly rather than other- 
wise. From the conversations he had had with 
different people, they seemed to exclude England 
from the quarrel altogether, and seemed to re- 
gard her as a country that would have no hand in 
the matter at all. One and all seemed deeply 
appreciative of England's efforts for peace, and 
spoke in the highest terms of Sir Edward Grey." 
The Germans can pardon France, though she 
is wronging herself and them, because they can 



[i66 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

at least conceive her hatred of them since 1871. 
They can understand that a barbarian and des- 
potic Empire like Russia, which thought itself 
the master of the continent, annoyed at finding a 
highly organized smaller Power in its way, rushes 
upon it to destroy it. But they cannot pardon 
the people and party led by the diplomats of 
England, with whom they never had any war 
or even a quarrel, for treacherously coming in 
to help the destroyers. 

Indications of the feelings of the best English- 
men were not wanting, however. A meeting of 
prominent men declared during the most critical 
time that a war against Germany would be "a 
war against civilization." We are not to forget 
either that England was the sole country where 
three ministers resigned because they were not 
willing to assume the responsibility for this war. 
We see that a high standard of political morals 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 167 

is by no means extinct in England, and that 
there are men left whose views coincide with 
those of Germany, Unhappily they seem to 
have no influence on the politics of their coun- 
try. 

What remains? This war is no more a war 
of races than it is one of principles. What M. 
Cambon said of a struggle between Teuton and 
Slav is but fiction. There are 25 millions of 
Slavs, the strong men of which are actually fight- 
ing with Germany and Austria. There are 40 
millions more (Poles, Bulgarians, Ukrainians) 
sympathizing with them. The number of Slavs 
who are for them is at least as large as the 
number of those against them. It is not a war 
of nations. The French, the English and the 
Russian peoples had as little wish for a war 
with the Central Powers as their people ever had 
to fight against them. It is, as a Spanish scholar 



ii68 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

said lately, a kind of civil war. It is a war cre- 
ated by the envy, ambition and low interest of 
a small number of persons who deluded them- 
selves and deceived the many. The interest and 
illusions of a few ambitious French politicians 
who made the fatal alliance with Russia, pre- 
cipitated their unfortunate country into a war 
created out of reckless ambition by a few Rus- 
sian Granddukes and their adherents. Only ir- 
responsible and merciless politicians like those 
who wield the power in Russia could let loose 
the horrors of such a war. No responsible states- 
man would ever have dared to do it. But France 
was forced to join and, seeing she could not 
do otherwise, tried to comfort herself morally 
with the hope that the moment of great revenge 
was near. England, who had engineered the 
dangerous diplomatic situation, joined, to profit 
by the occasion, for her commercial interest. 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 169; 

Germany is fighting to preserve that which 
she has achieved, while England is fighting not 
for her achievements but against them. 

The consequences will fall heavily on England 
and on all the world. 



APPENDIX I 

THE GERMAN ULTIMATUM 

Note handed by Herr von Below-Saleske, Ger- 
man Ambassador, to M. Davignon, Belgian Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs, at 2 o'clock p. m. of 
August 2, 1 9 14. 

Brussels, August 2, 1914. 

The German Government have sure informa- 
tion that French troops intend to march along 
the Meuse river by Givet and Namur. This news 
renders all further doubt as to the intention of 
France to march on Germany through Belgian 
territory impossible. The Imperial Government 
are afraid that Belgium in spite of the best in- 
tentions will be unable to repel a march of French 
forces of that strength. The fact constitutes 
a sufficient certainty of an imminent danger to 
Germany. 

It is Germany's imperious duty to prevent such 

an attack on the enemy's part. 

The German Government would deeply regret, 

170 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 171 

if Belgium should see in the fact that Germany 
is forced by measures of her enemies to violate 
Belgian territory, an act of hostility toward her- 
self. 

In order to exclude all misunderstandings, the 
German Government declare: 

L Germany intends no hostile act toward 
Belgium. If in the war which is beginning, Bel- 
gium consents to observe an attitude of friendly 
neutrality toward Germany, the German Govern- 
ment engage to guarantee the existence of the 
Kingdom and all its possessions for the time of 
peace. 

II. On the same condition Germany engages 
to evacuate Belgian territory as soon as peace is 
restored. 

III. If Belgium observes a friendly attitude, 
Germany is ready to buy and to pay cash — by 
concert with the Belgian authorities — for every- 
thing that is necessary to the German troops, and 
to pay damages for all detriment caused by them. 

IV. If Belgium should commit hostile acts 
against the German troops, if she should — in par- 



172 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

ticular — oppose difficulties to their advance, be 
it by means of the fortifications on the Meuse 
river, be it by destroying roads, railway lines, 
tunnels, and other v^orks of the kind, Germany 
will be forced to consider Belgium as a hostile 
power. 

In this case Germany will assume no engage- 
ments toward the Kingdom but will leave all fu- 
ture relations between the two states to the de- 
cision of arms. The German Government en- 
tertain the just hope that such a contingency will 
not arise and that the Belgian Government will 
apply all appropriate measures to prevent it. In 
this case the friendly relations existing between 
the two states will become still more close and 
durable. (Belgian Gray Book No. 20.) 



APPENDIX II 

THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK 

The French official publication is not nearly 
so clever as the British Blue Book. The Blue 
Book deals at least with facts, though they be 
often arranged and misrepresented with great 
cunning, while the French publications deal 
mostly with conjectures. Misrepresentation and, 
we are afraid, forgery is sometimes attempted,i 
but with so little skill that to all readers who 
have even a slight knowledge of the facts in 
question, the blunder is at once discernible. We 
would be inclined to speak of French superficial- 
ity, if we did not know the wonderful and most 
exact works of French historians which forbid 
generalisations of this kind. But is it possible 
that French statesmen who have lived in Ger- 
many for a long time and are known to be able 

173 



174 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

men, should be so absolutely incapable of judg- 
ing facts, persons, public opinion in Germany? 
Is it because they have always acted and judged 
according to a settled prejudice? or did they in- 
tentionally misrepresent events because they did 
not desire friendly relations between the two na- 
tions? Did they intend to delude the French 
reader or were they the dupes of their own ig- 
norance? How could they allow unconscien- 
tious subalterns to abuse their credulity in a way 
so gross as is shown by the documents published 
in this strange volimie ? 

I need only state that it contains, as No. 5, a 
note to M. Stephan Pichon, French Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, "On German public opinion as 
reported by diplomatic and consular agents,'' 
dated July 30, 19 13, in which we read literally 
the following passage: **The personality of the 
Emperor is being discussed, the Cnancellor is 
unpopular, but Herr von Kiderlen-Wachter was 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 175 

the most hated man in Germany last winter. 
Though still in discredit, however, he is not hated 
so much, for he intimates that he will soon have 
his revenge." Now, in July, 1913, Herr von 
Kiderlen-Wachter, the former Foreign Secre- 
tary, had been dead and buried for about half 
a year. 

I wonder what salary France pays to her Am- 
bassador and to her "diplomatic and consular 
agents'' for furnishing her such first-class in- 
formation on German politics.^ 

This important document which, as is at once 
evident from its date, has nothing whatever to 
do with the present crisis, is contained in a kind 



^We may, of course, look for another explanation of such an 
inadmissible blunder: What if the whole "document" had been 
compiled ad hoc from various reports, written at different pe- 
riods? Let us suppose the man entrusted with its compilation 
had overlooked the contradiction between the facts contained 
and the date he chose to put on his performance. Still, if this 
be the case, what is the worth of proofs and documents pre- 
pared and dated in such a way? What is the worth of the 
whole publication? 



176 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

of "Prelude," where, what one might call "Ger-. 
man Impressions" are to be found, impressions 
which are calculated to produce in their turn 
a certain desirable impression upon the mind of 
the reader, and to imbue him with the idea that 
the German Government and the German nation 
thirsted for war long before the Servian Ques- 
tion arose at all. 

It is preceded by another document, dated April 
2, 19 1 3, and printed as No. 2, an "official and 
secret report on the reinforcement of the Ger- 
man army" which M. Etienne, then French War 
Minister, sent to the Foreign Minister, M. Jon- 
nart. Not a word is said on the not unimportant 
question : viz. for what German office this secret 
report had been destined or from what German 
office it had taken its origin. It is given as of- 
ficial with all the candour of innocence.^ 

* One French paper, commenting on this document, stated that 
it had been found somewhere in Germany in a first-class railway 
compartment where a high German officer had forgotten it, other 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 177 

To anybody who knows the dry, matter-of-fact 
style of German official documents it is clear at 
first sight that the whole article, in which we find 
phrases of the "gnashed teeth of French Chauvi- 
nists,'' of the necessity of ''extending German 
Power all over the world" and the like, must at 
best have been stolen from the editor's office of 
some second-class Pan-Germanist Magazine, 
such as we often find ridiculed in "Simplicissi- 
miisf It culminates in the sentence that Ger- 
many must reconquer the old County of Bur- 
gundy because some five hundred years ago it 
had been a fief of the old Empire, a political 
idea which is of the same order and about as 
serious as if a fanatical subject of the Austrian 
Emperor should write upon the necessity of re- 
conquering the Kingdom of Jerusalem because 

journals, that it had been destined for no less a person than the 
Emperor himself, though, maybe, it was only the rough 
draught of a speech the German Chancellor had intended to 
make! 



[178 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

the Austrian Emperor is titular king of it. 

The only question is : Was the acquisition of 
this wonderful document a "sell" on the man who 
acquired it, or is the publication to be regarded 
as a *'seH" on French readers who are willing, 
of course, to believe anything possible in Ger- 
many? 

Unhappily the Ambassador and his staff are 
also quite incapable of discerning between facts 
and hearsays, or of judging the real significance 
of an event considered as a symptom of the state 
of Germany and German public opinion. The 
Frenchman, as ever, knows only France and 
French ways. 

For instance, in a note addressed on March 15, 
1913, by the naval attache of the Embassy, M. 
de Faramond, to the Naval Minister, M. Bau- 
din (Yellow Book No. i, Annex II), a conversa- 
tion between a member of the French Embassy 
and the Prince of Henckel-Donnersmarck is re- 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 179 

ported in which the latter said among other 
things : "The French are quite wrong in believ- 
ing that we have dark designs and wish for 
a w^ar. But we cannot forget that in 1870 pub- 
lic opinion forced the French Government to at- 
tack us in a foolish manner without being pre- 
pared. Who is to assure us that French public 
opinion always so quick to flare up in excitement, 
will not some day oblige the Government of the 
Republic to make war on us ? All we want is to 
be protected against this danger/' 

In No. 3 (Note by M. J. Cambon to M. Pichon 
of May 6, 191 3, Yellow Book No. 3), M. Cam- 
bon has heard that in military circles the Chief 
of the German General Staff, General von 
Moltke, is reported to have said : "We must do 
away with all trivial phrases concerning the re- 
sponsibility which will lie at the aggressor's door 
... on the day on which there will be nine 
chances to one that war is to break out, we have 



i8o ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

to forestall our chief adversary, and to begin 
without further delay to tread down brutally 
all resistance." Being a German officer, accus- 
tomed to silence and duty, General von Moltke, 
even if he had entertained such a thought, would 
never have given expression to it; least of all in 
the way in which it is reproduced in this note. 
But if we go on perusing the French publica- 
tion, we find that the reasonable and authentical 
words of Prince Donnersmarck are nothing to the 
French statesmen, while a tale which they ad- 
mit to be only a hearsay, reported for all we 
know, by the fourth or fifth person, gives the bias 
to their whole thought. 

Prince Henckel-Donnersmarck was mistaken 
only in so far as that, this time, it was not pub- 
lic opinion which forced the French Government, 
but the French Government which forced the 
public opinion of France, and is still trying to 
force it by such publications. 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR i8i 

No. 6 of the "Prelude" contains similar utter- 
ances, ascribed to General von Moltke and to the 
Emperor, which they are reported to have made 
in a private conversation with the King of Bel- 
gium in November, 1913. M. Cambon's author- 
ity seems to be the King of Belgium himself or, 
what is more probable, some person to whom the 
King confided his impression. M. Cambon him- 
self says only that he has his information from 
a "source absolutely sure." Now the German au- 
thorities have since stated in the "Norddeutsche 
AUgemeine 'Zeitung" that such a conversation 
never took place, but that the King of Belgium 
who had, of course, conferred with the German 
Emperor, had had another and strictly private 
conversation with General von Moltke at which 
nobody else was present. We can but conclude 
that, passing through several brains and as many 
mouths, everything, the persons conversing as 
well as their utterances, underwent the changes 



i82 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

which are inevitable in such cases, until finally 
they reached the childish tenor which best suited 
M. Cambon's intentions. 

We may open the pamphlet at random; every- 
where we find sources of information of the same 
nature : — gossips, hearsays,, conjectures, hypothe- 
ses, beliefs, suspicions. 

In No. 14 (Consular note, dated from Vienna 
July 20, 1 914), the intentions of the official Aus- 
trian Agency are suspected. In No. 16 M. Jules 
Cambon ''has every reason to believe that Ger- 
many will not intervene at the court of Vienna/' 
In No. 29, the same statesman wires that the 
Russian Charge d' Affaires ''is inclined to think'* 
that a great part of German public opinion is 
desirous of war. In No. 30 he believes the con- 
trary of what Herr von Jagow tells him. In No. 
55 M. Dumaine states his impression of what 
the Austrian Government will in future ''be-- 
lieve," In No. 57, a note of Sir M. de Bunsen 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 183 

(published in the British Blue Book as No. 95), 
in which he says that he is unable to verify a 
certain supposition, is quoted as a proof of the 
same supposition. In No. 102 M. Dumaine has 
''the suspicion" that Germany has caused Austria 
to attack Servia in order to be able herself to 
make war on Russia and France! 

Distrust of all German acts and disbelief in 
all German assertions appear to be a main char- 
acteristic of French statesmanship. Now to a 
certain extent this might seem comprehensible, 
though it must be clear at once how difficult the 
establishment of sincere and peaceful relations 
between the two nations was thereby rendered. 
But both the distrust and the disbelief go to a 
length which is simply illogical. No reason or 
evidence, however conclusive, holds out against 
French prejudice. 

It is in vain that Herr von Jagow and Herr 
von Schoen repeat over and over again (Yellow 



fi84 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

Book No. 30, 41, 57) that they had not been 
informed beforehand of the contents of the Aus- 
trian ultimatum. The French statesmen will not 
believe it. But they are quite ready to believe 
that the Italian statesmen had not been informed 
of it. Yet Germany being bound to assist Aus- 
tria against Russia under all circumstances, and 
Italy being bound to do so only if the measure 
"taken had been preconcerted v^ith her, it would 
have been much more important to Austrian 
statesmen to inform the Italian Cabinet of their 
intentions than to inform their German Col- 
leagues. M. Cambon with all his intelligence 
did not see that the Austrian Government, in 
spite of its close and faithful alliance with Ger- 
many, had always jealously guarded its indepen- 
dence of German dictates in what it considered 
its own affairs. 

I can but repeat what has been said on the 
question in the second part of this study. Aus- 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 185 

trian politicians had no need to be goaded on in 
this matter. They, not the German Government,! 
had felt for years the burning and irritating 
wound caused by Servian propaganda; their 
heir apparent had been murdered, not the Ger- 
man prince. It is quite possible and even prob- 
able that Austrian statesmen feared that the 
German Government as v^ell as the Italian, 
both being very interested in the result, might 
try to exert a moderating influence on them, of 
which they would have been impatient. That 
this would in fact have been the case is ren- 
dered particularly probable by a conversation 
between Sir Horace Rumbold and Herr von 
Jagow which took place on July 25, and is re- 
ported in a note of the same day, published in 
the British Blue Book No. 18. 

If it were worth while to examine the whole 
performance in detail, one could easily make a 
long article by merely pointing out inaccurate 



i86 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

statements and false suppositions. But we need 
only dwell on a few important passages. 

I. The question discussed by us in our digre^ 
sion on the British Blue Book on p. 110-9 is 
treated in the following way in the French Yel- 
low Book. 

On July 29, M. Paleologue, French Ambassa- 
dor in St. Petersburg, states that the Austro- 
Hungarian Government refused the Russian 
Government's invitation for direct negotiations 
between the two Cabinets (Yell. B. No. 91) ; M. 
Dumaine wires from Vienna that Count Berch- 
told flatly refused the demand of M. Schebeko 
for particular powers to be given to Count 
Szapary for that end (Yell. B. No. 94), and M. 
Paul Cambon in London has heard that Sir Ed- 
ward Grey informed Prince Lichnowsky of Aus- 
tria's refusal. (Yell. B. No. 96.) M. Sazonof 
himself telegraphs to his Ambassador in Paris 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 187 

tHat the fact of Austria's having declared war 
on Servia makes a continuation of his confer- 
ences with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador 
impossible (Yell. B. No. 95). 

In the meanwhile M. Jules Cambon, French 
Ambassador in Berlin, has telegraphed from Ber- 
lin, that the German Chancellor is intervening 
in favor of a continuation of these conferences 
'(Yell. Book No. 92), and M. Bienvenu-Martin, 
acting French Foreign Minister, has received the 
same information from Herr von Schoen, the 
jG'^rman Ambassador in Paris. (Yell. B. No. 
94.) Consequent upon this M. Dumaine is in a 
position to telegraph from Vienna on the next 
day — ^July 30 — that the conferences between Aus- 
tria and Russia are to continue, the interrup- 
tion being due to a misunderstanding, Count 
Berchtold having believed that the Austrian ul- 
timatum itself, that is to say Austria's demands, 
'should be discussed, to which he could by no 



1 88 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

means consent. (Yell. B. No. 104.) On the 
following day — ^July 31 — M. Viviani, the FrencK 
Premier and Foreign Minister, informs his Am- 
bassadors of M. Sazonof's "formula" which the 
French Government is ready to accept, and M. 
Paleologue informs him in turn of the altera- 
tion of the formula (Yell. Book No. 112 and 

113). 

So far everything is correct; but now the same 
mode of juggling sets in which we have observed 
in the Introduction to the British Blue Book 
and in Sir Maurice de Bunsen's letter. In a 
note of Aug. i, the day after the German ulti- 
matum, — this is very important to note — M. Vi- 
viani says that on the evening before the Aus- 
trian Ambassador in Paris, Count Szecsen, had 
informed him of the intention of his Government 
not to aspire to any territorial aggrandisement in 
Servia, on condition that the conflict should be 
localised to Austria and Servia only; and that 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 189 

the Russian Government had been notified of 
the same. Yet in the same note M. Viviani pre- 
tends that in St. Petersburg M. Sazonof had 
been informed by Count Szapary of Austrian 
readiness to discuss the ultimatum itself. You 
see, the Russian Minister went in his interpre- 
tation of Austria's oflfers just the one step fur- 
ther which is all important and which Austria 
was not willing to go. Had negotiations con- 
tinued, he would probably have said, as Sir Ed- 
ward Grey said on another memorable occasion, 
that he had "misunderstood" Count Szapary or 
that he had been misunderstood himself; his pre- 
tension was simply a ^'ballon d! essay!' But as 
further negotiations were cut short by the war, 
M. Viviani and Sir Maurice took up the ''ball,'' 
because it enabled them to lay the blame on Ger- 
many. The way, however, in which this was 
done by the French Minister is so very strange 
that it has to be stated in detail here. For in 



ii9o ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

the introductory lines of that same note (YelL 
B. No. 120) M. Viviani says that the Austrian 
Ambassadors had, on the previous day, made 
two conciliatory steps, one rather vague in Paris, 
and one very precise at St. Petersburg. Now, 
whoever reads M. Viviani's own note must see 
that just the opposite had been the case, that 
Count Szecsen had made in Paris a very pre- 
cise statement ; having said according to Viviani's 
own words, that "the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment had no territorial ambition and would not 
touch the independence of the Servian State; 
that it had no intention to occupy the Sandjak; 
but that these same declarations of disinterested- 
ness should be valid only in case of a localisa- 
tion of the conflict, as a European war might 
bring eventualities which nobody was in a situ- 
ation to foresee." M. Viviani adds that Q)unt 
Szecsen commented upon this declaration and 
gave him to understand that "though his Gov- 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 191 

I 

ernment could not answer any questions put to 
it by the Powers in their own name, it could 
undoubtedly answer questions put by Servia her- 
self or by another Power in Servia's name, and 
that there might be some hope in this." On the 
contrary. Count Szapary is said to have declared 
to M. Sazonof ''his Government's readiness to 
discuss the contents of the ultimatum''; nothing 
more! 

How curious that M. Viviani should call this 
declaration which could not be more vague, a 
precise one, and Count Szecsen's declaration 
which could not be preciser a vague one ? 

In fact. Count Szecsen and Count Szapary had 
both received exactly the same information from 
their Government, and had both stated exactly 
the same thing, one to M. Viviani and the other 
to M. Sazonof; yet as M. Sazonof had seen fit 
to misunderstand Count Szapary, and to believe 
that Austria was willing to defer to a conference 



192 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

of the Powers, M. Viviani sav fit to believe M. 
Sazonof and to disbelieve the explicit and of- 
ficial communication which the Austrian Am- 
bassador had made to him in his Government's 
name, and in which a deference to the Powers 
was expressly excluded! 

All this is curious, but what is more curious 
is that, in his next note, M. Viviani also goes 
one step further and says that he informed the 
German Ambassador of his having received com- 
munications from the Austrian Government de- 
claring that it had no desire for aggrandisement 
in Servia, nor would it invade the Sandjak; and 
that it was ready to discuss the whole question 
in London with the other Powers. 

Now here we have a direct falsehood; for 
never had M. Viviani received such a communi- 
cation from the Austrian Government. Count 
Szecsen having declared only the first part of it, 
M. Viviani had heard from the Russian Govern- 



ORIGIN OF THE W AR 193 

ment— but not from Austria— that Austria had 
declared herself ready to discuss the Servian ul- 
timatum. Now, this makes all the difference in 
the world! And not even Sazonof had dared to 
pretend that Austria was really willing to dis- 
cuss in London with the Powers; he had only 
said that such was his own wish ! 

Owing to the publication of the Austrian Red 
Book which has appeared just as this little study 
is going to print, we are in a position to give^ 
the exact tenor of the information which Count 
Szapary had received from his government: 

In his telegram of July 30, 1914 (Red Book 
No. 49), Count Berchtold forwarded the follow- 
ing instruction: "Answer to Your Excellency's 
telegram of July 29 : As before, I do, of course, 
not object to Your Excellency's explaining to M. 
Sazonof the various points of our note to Servia, 
though later events (viz. the Austrian declaration 
of war on Servia) have deprived it of actuality. 



194 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

I should also particularly appreciate it if on this 
occasion — as M. Schebeko intimated — the ques- 
tions directly concerning our relations to Russia 
would be discussed in a friendly and confidential 
manner. As a result of such a discussion, one 
may hope that incertainties and doubts which 
much to our regret exist, may be cleared, and 
the desirable peaceful development of further 
relations between the two neighbouring Empires 
be assured." 

In order to exclude all incertainty as to the 
meaning of this telegram, Count Berchtold wired 
a second time on the same day (Red Book No. 

50): 

"As I telegraphed to-day. Your Excellency is 
free to give to M. Sazonof all explanations de- 
sired concerning our note, though the outbreak 
of the war has deprived it of actuality. Such 
explanations can, of course, be nothing more 
than a comment post factum, as it has never been 



ORIGIN OF THE W AR 195 

our intention to yield on any point of our note. 
I have, moreover, empowered Your Excellency to 
discuss our special relations to Russia with M. 
Sazonof in a friendly way/' 

To this Count Szapary gave answer in a tele- 
gram of Aug. I, 1914 (Red Book No. 56) : '^ . . . 
I told M. Sazonof that it was an error that we 
had declined further negotiations with Russia. 
I informed him that Your Excellency was not 
only ready to treat with Russia on the broadest 
basis but particularly to discuss the text of our 
note, in so far as an interpretation of the text 
should be desired. . . . On M. Sazonof s calling 
my attention to the fact that a discussion in St. 
Petersburg seemed for obvious reasons to give 
less hope of success than one in neutral London, 
I gave answer that Your Excellency intended, as 
I had told him before, direct communication 
with St. Petersburg, that I was not in a posi- 
tion to make any utterance on his proposal of 



196 ORIGIN OF THE WAR ' 

a discussion in London, but would report on it 
to Your Excellency/' 

The case is quite clear, and the mildest in- 
terpretation of the whole proceeding would be 
the following: All the Powers wished for di- 
rect conferences between Russia and Austria, 
which Austria refused because Russia desired 
them to go farther than Austria thought she 
could permit ; upon Germany's intervention Aus- 
tria consented, on the express condition that her 
demands as, stated in the ultimatum should not 
be touched on. M. Sazonof, however, at once 
made the attempt to disregard the Austrian con- 
dition by trying to impose his formula on her; 
and he probably did this, because in Germany's 
intervention and in Count Pourtales' earnest ap- 
peal on behalf of peace (see Brit. Blue Book No. 
97), he believed he saw a sign of weakness on 
Germany's side. When he found out that he 
had deceived himself and failed to triumph in 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 197 

this way, he simply bade his representatives 
state the untruth that Austria had been quite 
willing to do on the 31st, what she had flatly 
refused until then. And the British as well as 
the French statesmen seconded him in this, not 
only because they desired Russia's triumph, but 
because they desired still more to deceive the 
world concerning the fact, that Germany had 
seriously intervened in Vienna in the interests 
of peace; and because in what they well knew 
to be a Russian stratagem and an absolute un- 
truth, they saw a further possibility to lay the 
blame on Germany. 

We would fain believe that in the hurry and 
excitement of the hour such a misunderstanding 
had been possible, were not the methods adopted 
in these misunderstandings so curiously and so 
exactly alike in Sir Maurice de Bunsen's letter 
of Sept. I, and in M. Viviani's note of August 



198 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

I, which note — observe! — ^was not published un- 
til December, 1914. 

There is, however, a piece of still more curi- 
ous information to be found in the Yellow Book: 

On page 127 we find printed as No. 115 a note 
from M. Dumaine to M. Viviani, dated Vienna, 
July 31, 1914, in which the Ambassador informs 
the Minister that "general mobilisation had been 
decreed by the Austro-Hungarian Government on 
the same day at one o'clock after midnight." On 
page 129, follows as No. 118 a note by M. Paleo- 
logue from St. Petersburg, dated the same day, 
in which it is said, that ''because of the general 
mobilisation in Austria and the secret measures 
taken in Germany, the order for general mobili- 
sation of the Russian army had been issued." 

Now these two notes and their arrangement 
constitute a falsification of facts. Austrian 
statesmen for a long time and as late as July 
29 gave expression to the hope that Russia would 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 199 



not interfere (see British Blue Book No. 32 and 
71). It is known to all the world that Austria 
mobilised against Servia only, until, by Russia's 
having mobilised against her during several days, 
she was finally forced to mobilise herself in Ga- 
licia on July 31 (see Red Book No. 53). This 
fact is confirmed by the English Ambassador in 
St. Petersburg, Sir G. Buchanan, in his note 
of July 25 (Blue Book No. 6), in which he re- 
ports on M. Sazonof's declaration that "if Aus- 
tria proceeded to embark on military measures 
against Servia, Russian mobilisation would have 
to be carried out." It is confirmed by the Czar 
himself, who in his telegram to the German Em- 
peror of July 30, which is reprinted in the Yellow 
Book on page 211, states that Russian military 
measures had been decreed five days ago, that is 
to say on July 25, as a measure of defence against 
Austria's preparations (against Servia, of 
course). Not a word is said of a general mobili- 



200 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

sation having taken place in Austria in the tele- 
gram in which Sir G. Buchanan informed his 
Government of the Russian order. The British 
Ambassador says : ^^This decision has been taken 
in consequence of report received from Russian 
Ambassador at Vienna to the effect that Austria 
is determined not to yield to intervention of Pow- 
ers, and that she is moving troops against Rus- 
sia as well as against Servia." It is, therefore, 
clear that the text of the M. Paleologue's note 
has been changed and arranged for publication. 
By a rather poor trick the telegram announcing 
the Austrian general mobilisation has been 
printed before the telegram announcing the Rus- 
sian one, though the two orders having been is- 
sued in the inverse order, the telegrams, neces- 
sarily, had likewise been sent in the inverse or- 
der. It is further a conscious falsehood when 
in his note of August i, M. Viviani says or pre- 
tends to have said that ''Austria first proceeded 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 201 



to a general mobilisation." (Yellow Book No. 
127.) All this is obviously done with the inten- 
tion of freeing Russia from blame, and laying 
on Austria the responsibility of having broken 
the world's peace. 

Now M. Viviani shows himself too solicitous a 
friend. In order to please England, he states 
that Austria on July 31 was ready to submit to 
Russia and to allow her demands to be discussed 
by a conference of the Powers, and that only 
the thunderbolt of the German ultimatum, de- 
spatched to Russia on the same day at noon, 
destroyed the hopes founded on Austria's peace- 
ful dispositions. And in order to please Russia, 
he states in the same breath that while Russia 
showed an incontestable goodwill ('^montrait une 
bonne volonte incontestable"), Austria, peaceful 
Austria, proceeded in the first hour of the very 
same day on which she is said to have yielded, 
first of all Powers, to a general mobilisation. 



202 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 

and this not after the German ultimatum but 
eleven hours before ! For M. Dumaine, French 
Ambassador in Vienna, states expressly in his 
telegram that the Austrian order for general 
mobilisation had been decreed at one o'clock in 
the morning of July 31. It is an old saying that 
he who proves too much does prove nothing at all. 

For, if M. Dumaine in his telegram, Sir Mau- 
rice de Bunsen in his letter. Sir Edward Grey 
in his introduction, M. Viviani in his Yellow 
Book, and M. Sazonof in his notes have said 
the truth, Austria on the evening of the same 
day on which she had issued the order for gen- 
eral mobilisation against Russia declared her- 
self ready to do all that Russia desired! 

The lesson conveyed by these astonishing facts 
seems to be: If you see fit to make false state- 
ments, do not make two which are flatly contra- 
dictory to each other. For either Austria was 
the first to issue the order for general mobilisa- 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 203 

tion on the morning of July 31, and then cer- 
tainly her intentions on that day were far from 
peaceful, and Germany could not interrupt any 
negotiations between her and Russia; or Aus- 
tria was peaceful, and then she cannot have been 
the first of all Powers to decree general mobili- 
sation on July 31. 

II. The French note which has been altered 
several times in the British Blue Book (see pp. 
121-2 of this study) seems to have never been the 
genuine French note at all. We do not venture 
to decide whether the first alterations were made 
by the French Embassy in London on its own 
account or on the demand of the British Foreign 
Office. We do but state the fact. 

The publication of the French Yellow Book 
affords evidence that the whole text of the French 
Foreign Minister's note has been changed. The 
original which is reprinted in the Yellow Book 



204 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 



as No. 1 06 on p. 120, is dated from July 30, and 
even these sentences which are contained in both 
versions are rendered in a different sequence. 
For the reader's convenience, both texts are re- 
printed here and put beside each other. The 
parts contained in both notes are printed in 
italics, the passage quoted on p. 122, which is 
added in the Blue Book while it is not to be 
found in the original note, is designated by quo- 
tation-marks. 



Yellow Book No. io6. 

M. Rene Viviani, President du 
Conseil, Ministre des Affaires 
etrangeres, a M. Paul Cambon, 
Ambassadeur de France a 
Londres. 

Paris, le 30 juillet 1914. 

Je vous prie de porter a la 
connaissance de Sir Edward 
Grey les renseignements sui- 
vants touchant les preparatifs 
militaires frangais et alle- 
mands, L'Angleterre y verra 
que si la France est resolue, ce 
n'est pas elle qui prend des 
mesures d'agression. 

Vous attirerez Tattention de 
Sir Edward Grey sur la de- 
cision prise par le Conseil des 



Blue Book No. 105, Enclosure 
III 

French Minister for Foreign 

Affairs to M. Cambon, French 

Ambassador in London. 

Paris, le 31 Juillet 1914. 
'VARMEE allemande a ses 
avant-postes sur nos homes- 
frontieres, Vendredi hier; par 
deux fois des patrouilles alle- 
mandes ont penctre sur notre 
territoire. Nos avant-postes 
sont en retraite a 10 kilom. en 
arriere ^ de la^ frontiere. Les 
populations ainsi abandonnees 
a Tattaque de Tarmee adverse 
protestent; mais le Gouverne- 
ment tient a montrer a I'opin- 
ion publique et au Gouverne- 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 



205 



Yellow Book No. 106 — Cont. 
Ministres de ce matin: bien 
que rAllemagne ait pris ses 
dispositifs de couverture a 
quelques centaines de metres 
de la frontiere, sur tout le 
front du Luxembourg aux 
Vosges, et porte ses troupes de 
couverture sur leurs positions 
de combat, nous avons retenu 
nos troupes a 10 kilometres de 
la frontiere, en leur interdisant 
de s'en rapprocher d'avantage. 

Notre plan, congu dans un 
esprit d'offensive, prevoyait 
pourtant que les positions de 
combat de nos troupes de cou- 
verture seraient aussi rappro- 
chees que possible de la fron- 
tiere. En livrant ainsi une 
bande du territoire sans de- 
fense a I'agression soudaine de 
I'ennemi, le Gouvernement de 
la Republique tient a montrer 
que la France, pas plus que la 
Russie, n'a la responsabilite de 
Tattaque. 

Pour s'en assurer, il suffit de 
comparer les mesures prises 
des deux cotes de notre fron- 
tiere: en France, les permis- 
sionnaires n'ont ete rappeles 
qu'apres que nous avons acquis 
la certitude que I'Allemagne 
I'avait fait depuis cinq jours. 

En Allemagne, non seule- 
ment les troupes en garnison 
a Metz ont ete poussees 
jusqu'a la frontiere, mais en- 
core elles ont ete renforcees 
par des^ elements transportes 
en chemin de fer des garnisons 
de I'interieur, telles que celles 
de Treves ou de Cologne. 



Blue Book No. 105, Enclosure 
III. Continued 

ment britannique que I'agres- 
seur ne sera en aucun cas la 
France. Tout le 16^ Corps de 
Metz renforce par une partie 
du 8^ venu de Treves et de Co- 
logne occupe la frontiere de 
Metz au Luxembourg. Le 75* 
Corps d'Armee de Strasbourg 
a serre sur la frontiere. Sous 
menace d'etre fusilles les Al- 
saciens-Lorrains des pays an- 
nexes^ ne peuvent pas passer la 
frontiere; des reservistes par 
dizaines de milliers sont rap- 
peles^ en Allemagne ; c'est le 
dernier stade avant la mobili- 
sation; or nous n'avons rap- 
pele aucun reserviste. 

Comme vous le voyez, I'Alle- 
magne I'a fait. "J'ajoute que 
''toutes nos informations con- 
'cordent pour montrer que les 
'preparatifs allemands ont 
'commence samedi, le jour 
'meme de la remise de la note 
'autrichienne." 

Ces elements, ajoutes a ceux 
contenus dans mon telegramme 
d'hier vous permettent de faire 
la preuve au Gouvernement 
britannique de la volonte paci- 
fique de Tun, et des intentions 
agressives de I'autre. 



2o6 ORIGIN OF THE WAR 



Yellow Book No. io6—ConL 
Rien d'analogue n'a ete fait 
en France. 

L'armement des places de 
la frontiere (deboisements, 
mise en place de rarmement, 
construction de batteries, ren- 
forcement de reseaux de fil 
de fer) a ete commence en 
AUemagne des le samedi 25; 
chez nous, il va I'etre, la 
France ne pouvant plus se dis- 
penser de prendre les memes 
mesures. 

Les gares ont ete occupees 
militairement en AUemagne le 
samedi 25, en France le mardi 
28. 

Eniin, en AUemagne, les re- 
servistes, par dizaine de rml- 
liers, ont ete rappeles par con- 
vocations individuelles, ceux 
residant a I'etranger (classes 
de 1903 a 1911) rappeles, les 
officiers de reserve convoques; 
a rinterieur, les routes sont 
barrees, les automobiles ne cir- 
culent qu'avec un permis. C'est 
le dernier stade avant la mo- 
bilisation. Aucune de ces me- 
sures n'a ete prise en France. 

L'armee allemande a ses 
avant-postes sur nos hornes- 
fronticres; par deux fois, Her, 
des patrouilles allemandes ont 
pcnetre sur noire territoire. 
Tout le XVP Corps de Mets, 
renforce par une partie du 
Vlir venu de Trdves et de 
Cologne, occupe la frontiere 
de Metz au Luxembourg; le 
XV^ Corps d'armee de Stras- 
bourg a serre sur la frontiere. 

Sous menace d'etre fusilles. 



ORIGIN OF THE WAR 207 

yellow Book No. io6 — Cont. 
les Alsaciens-Lorrains des pays 
annexes ont defense de passer 
la frontiere. 

Rene Viviani. 

We offer no comments except the repeated 
question: What confidence can serious readers 
grant to official pubHcations where the pubHshed 
documents appear to be arranged and altered at 
convenience ? 

As to the parts of the French publication which 
seem serious and genuine, they offer nothing new 
but contain only facts which are already known. 



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